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STANDING AND THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS:
TRIPLE ERROR DECISIONS IN CLAPPER V. AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL USA AND CITY OF
LOS ANGELES V. LYONS
Vicki C. Jackson*
The question of standingis a subcategory of justiciability doctrine, which funda-
mentallyconcerns a set of questions about the role of the judiciary in U.S. constitutional
democracy. What makes these questions fraught, and complex, is that amongthe rights
deservingof protection in any constitutional democracy is the structural right to demo-
cratic self-governance, a right that is arguably at risk whenever courts are asked to
invalidate government action authorized by democratically elected bodies in enacted
laws in order to protect other rights constitutionally secured to individuals.1 The
U.S. Supreme Court has longbeen accused of unprincipled manipulation of standing
and other justiciability doctrines.2 But some degree of inconsistency in justiciability
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suggestions. Thanks as well to Andres Salinas, Harvard J.D. expected 2016, for valuable re-
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Please see infra note 43concerningmy own involvement in one of the cases discussed.
1 Although the Court has from time to time stated that the Constitution provides no right
to vote, see, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531U.S. 98, 104(2000), such a viewplaces too much weight
on the absence of one kind of explicit text (right to vote) and misses the significance of the
Constitutions clear textual, and structural, commitments to elections. The Republican form of
government clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, can be understood to backstop the Constitutions
implicit requirement that state legislatures and hence the Congress, see U.S. CONST. art. I, §
2, and the Seventeenth Amendment be popularly elected. The structural requirement of
elected legislatures, expressed in these constitutional texts requiringthat representatives be
elected by the people, reflects a theory of political legitimacy that rests, ultimately, on the
right of self-government, of government by consent of the people. Invalidation of laws and
acts by elected officials claimed to violate individual rights can be viewed as disruptingrights
of self-governance. That is, there are often important constitutional values on both sides of
major constitutional controversies whose weight might varydependingonthe degree ofconnec-
tion and accountability for the challenged act (e.g., between challenges to recently enacted leg-
islation and challenges to the constitutionalityof discrete acts of executive branch personnel).
See infra note 176.
2 See, e.g., GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 116, 121(7th ed. 2013)
(suggestingstandinglaw is inconsistent when it treats loss of an opportunity for something,
rather than the thing itself, as an Article III injury and that [s]tanding doctrine went wrong
in Data Processing in 1970); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98YALE L.J.
127
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doctrines application may be inevitable across the wide range of substantive issues
that arise as the federal courts, headed by the Supreme Court, seek to find a proper
balance between their role in redressingor preventingviolations of constitutional
rights and limits on the one hand, and an understandable hesitation about interfering
in the process (and rights)of self-governance on the other.
Determinations of justiciability were at the heart of Alexander Bickels argument
for the passive virtues, involving what Bickel called a power to decline the exercise
of jurisdiction in some cases.3 This power, he argued, was necessary to allow the
Court, exist[ing] in the Lincolnian tension between principle and expediency, to play
its importantly countermajoritarian role in other cases.4 In his Harvard Foreword,
Bickel implied that the Court, even if it is not as principled in deciding not to decide
as it must be in deciding the merits, must remain a forum of decency and reason;
it must not engage in undisciplined or merely expedient decisionmaking, but must
be governed by standards of prudence.5 For Gerald Gunther, however, Bickels
arguments for prudential avoidance of full merits decision were too great a threat to
the Courts role as principled adjudicator.6
221 (1988) (noting critique of standing law as incoherent and arguing that modern standing
doctrine misses the right question, which is whether the plaintiff has a legal right to judicial
enforcement of an enforceable legal duty and calling for revised understandings of virtually
all of standinglaw);Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor
Brilmayer, 93HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1715n.72(1980)(expressinghighly skeptical view of
standinglawas inconsistent and subject to manipulation);Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1372(1988)(noting
the traditional criticisms of standing law . . . that it is confusing and seemingly incoherent);
see also Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate
for Claim for Relief, 83YALE L.J. 425(1974);David P. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing,
1981SUP. CT. REV. 41(1981);Cass R. Sunstein, Whats Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, Injuries, and Article III, 91MICH. L. REV. 163(1992).
3 AlexanderM. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 TermForeword: The Passive Virtues,
75HARV. L. REV. 40, 43, 47 (1961) (arguing that the passive virtues of deciding when not
to decide are necessary to sustain the Courts legitimacy to adjudicate on the merits).
4 Id. at 50.
5 Id. at 51;cf. David Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545
(1985) ([D]iscretion need not mean incoherence, indeterminancy, or caprice; nor is discretion
at odds with the recognition of responsibility for the adjudication of disputes.).
6 Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the Passive VirtuesA Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (opposing Bickels approach
as unprincipled and inconsistent with the Courts adjudicatory obligations). Gunther was es-
pecially critical of Bickels praise for the Courts dismissing for want of a substantial federal
question the appeal in Naim v. Naim, 197Va. 734, 90S.E.2d 849, appeal dismissed, 350
U.S. 985(1956), in which the lower court had rejected a constitutional challenge to anti-
miscegenation laws. Gunther, supra, at 1112. Bickel and Gunther agreed that the Court
could not uphold such laws in light of the principle of Brown. Id.;ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 174 (1962). But Bickel treated the Courts action as essen-
tially equivalent to denyingcertiorari;Gunther concluded that such dismissals do speak to the
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Considerations of prudence are reflected across standing doctrine. As Bickel
argued, standing originally meant that the courts may not decide non-cases, which
are not adversary situations and in which nothingof immediate consequence to the
parties turns on the results, and that further development of standing reflects the
Courts development of doctrine that essentially declined to exercise a jurisdiction
it lawfully had.7 Thus, as Bickels work suggests, much of the Courts doctrine, though
denoted as constitutional as opposed to prudential by the Court,8can be regarded
as reflectingconsiderations of prudence rather than ineluctable understandings of the
constitutional terms case or controversy.9In the philosophy of Aquinas, prudence
was a form of wisdom, distinct from but allied to justice as a cardinal virtue.10The
well-known disputes between Bickel and Gunther might be taken to raise questions
of whether prudence can be married to sufficiently principled reason. Or is the idea
of a reasoned or principled prudence an oxymoron?11
merits of the lower court decision, denyingthe Courts mandatory jurisdiction because the
federal challenge was so without merit, and as such the Naim decision was inconsistent with
the Courts role as principled adjudicator. Id. at 12.
7 See Bickel, supra note 3, at 4243; see also BICKEL, supra note 6, at 11927.
8 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468U.S. 737(1984)(distinguishingthe three so-called
constitutional components of standing injury, causation, and redressability from three
other so-called prudential aspects of standing).
9 See, e.g., Winter, supra note 2, at 137273 (noting the Burger Courts expansion of the
irreducible minimum [Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, 454U.S. 464, 472(1982)]to include the requirements that the plaintiff
also show that the injury was caused by the defendants allegedly illegal conduct and that the
injury is one that can be redressed by the courts decision. (footnote omitted)). The entire
structure of standinglawis (relatively)a newly created doctrine of the mid-20th century, one
that many scholars have concluded is not constitutionally compelled. Not only was standing
a mid-20th century invention, largely of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter, designed at first to
protect progressive or NewDeal programs from judicial interference, but, as well-rehearsed
in scholarly literature in the 1970s and 1980s, standing doctrine only came to focus on
injury in fact as an element beginning in 1970, with requirements of traceability and
redressability added later. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of
Public Law, 88COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1434 n.9 (1988) (stating that the writ tradition, espe-
cially at the origin of the republic, makes it extremely awkward to suggest that modern notions
of injury in fact . . . have constitutional status); Winter, supra note 2, at 1374, 144057; see
also Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?,
78YALE L.J. 816(1969);Fletcher, supra note 2, at 22425; Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as
Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116U. PA. L. REV.
1033(1968).
10 See John Finnis, Aquinas Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Summer 2014Edition)(Edward N. Zalta ed.), http://plato
.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/aquinas-moral-political (notingthat, accordingto
Aquinas, prudence enters into every other virtue, including justice).
11 For an elegant and eloquent defense of the concept of principled discretion, see Shapiro,
supra note 5, at 57879.
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Standingdoctrine presents an interestingtest case.12Some applications of stand-
ingdoctrine, reflectinggenuine concerns about whether the particular party invoking
jurisdiction has the appropriate connection to the subject matter, rely on reasoning
that has only limited effects in excludingArticle III courts from adjudicatingan issue.13
In such cases, whether the decision is fully principled or not, the prudential arguments
to withhold jurisdiction are supported by the likelihood that another party will soon
be able to challenge similar conduct. But standingis sometimes used by the Court to
shelter large swathes of governmental conduct from the most effective forms of judi-
cial review, as in these two cases separated by three decades:Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA14and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.15In these cases, I will argue,
the Courts decisions have the virtues of neither consistency with well-established
principle, nor of wisdom.
A fundamental idea behind justiciability doctrines is that the mere fact of an as-
serted, or actual, illegality is not sufficient for courts to act. This idea is a distinctive
one, not followed by all constitutional democracies, in some of which courts stand as
more general monitors of the legality of the actions of other branches.16Justiciability
doctrines can be understood, in part, to reflect the United States commitments to
democratic decisionmaking, commitments that in some respects far exceed those of
12 For a thoughtful effort to identify a meaningful legal order to the Courts standing
doctrine, see Richard Fallons contribution to this symposium. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How
to Make Sense of Supreme Court Standing CasesA Plea for the Right Kind of Realism, 23
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105(2014)[hereinafter Fallon, Realism]. See also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing and What To Do About It, 93TEX. L. REV. (forth-
coming2015)[hereinafter Fallon, Fragmentation](arguingthat standingdoctrine reflects real
differences based on substantive issues and arguing that the Court should acknowledge that
what counts as an injury will depend on the provision under which a plaintiff brings suit).
13 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542U.S. 1(2004). Whether else
may be said, the prudential denial of standingin Newdow would not prevent custodial parents
from raisingreligiously based First Amendment challenges to recitation of words about God
in the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools and is thus unlikely to have any long-term effects
on the adjudication of such challenges. A similar argument could be made about the denial
of standingin Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133S. Ct. 2652(2013), though with less clarity. In
Perry, the issue of the constitutionality of the states ban on same-sex marriage had been
adjudicated in the lower Article III courts;the dispute was only about appellate standing,
when state officials declined to appeal and proponents of the referendum that resulted in the
ban invoked the Courts jurisdiction. While the reasoning in Perry may have systematic ef-
fects in excludingproponents of successful referenda from seekingreviewwhen state officials
fail to do so, such issues were adjudicated in the trial level Article III court and in any event are
unlikely to escape Supreme Court reviewbecause officials in other states may have standing
to seek review of successful challenges to their own similar laws.
14 133S. Ct. 1138(2013).
15 461U.S. 95(1983).
16 See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
52535, 899922 (2d ed. 2006) (describing abstract review in Germanys Constitutional
Court and exploringthe claimed absence of a political question doctrine in Germany).
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otherwise comparable polities. One need think no further than the fact that a majority
of states elect, or subject to reelection, a significant number of their judges, to have a
sense of this difference. Justiciability doctrines also reflect instincts for institutional
self-protection for the courts, of a kind with which Bickels arguments for avoidance
of decision were concerned.
The core idea of standingis that the person invokingan Article III courts juris-
diction must have suffered (or be likely to suffer)injury requiringjudicial redress.
Although several rationales for standing doctrine have been offered,17an important
set of justifications are related to those for other justiciability doctrines:By limiting
standingto those sufferingconcrete injury, standingdoctrines may help insulate the
courts from, or delay their involvement in, ideological battles between the branches,18
thereby protectingjudicial independence, an independence in part grounded in the
idea that the Courts jurisdiction is demarcated from the policy-making sphere of
elected officials.
But the idea that justiciability doctrines help conserve the courts interventions for
when they are most needed is also grounded in a vision of the affirmative role the
courts are to play in securingthe actual protection of constitutional rights, so that they
are not mere parchment rights.19 The courts role in so doing is especially impor-
tant in settings where ordinary political processes cannot be expected to provide ade-
quate protection to those rights.20That their role is to assure the protection of rights
17 These include the idea that without a concrete stake, a party may not aggressively ad-
vocate and thereby deprive the courts of the procedural basis for the exercise of adjudicatory
powers (a concern that, in cases involvingdeeply committed legal public interest groups, has
little connection to the reality of hard fought litigation), and the idea that standinghelps
prevent bystanders, or those lacking so direct a connection to a matter, from litigating in
place of those more directly affected, an important concern articulated, for example, in Lea
Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the Case or Controversy
Requirement, 93HARV. L. REV. 297(1979). In this paper I primarily focus on the justifi-
cations for standing that sound in preventing usurpation of the political branches power.
18 Cf. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146 (stating that standing doctrine serves to prevent the
judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches).
19 Cf. THEFEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (arguing against the sufficiency of trust
[in]parchment barriers against the encroachingspirit of power to establish practical security
to each branch from the exercise of powers by the others). The proposition that an important
function of Article III courts is the protection of rights that majoritarian processes may not
account for is not particularly controversial (in contrast to the debate over the courts role,
vel non, in enforcingstructural limits on branches and levels of government). This paper is
concerned primarily with the protection of individual rights, as distinct from structures, but
has taken note, above, of the complexity of issues that can arise if one recognizes as a
formidable right at once individually and collectively exercised the right of democratic
self-government.
20 For the most prominent scholarly exposition of this representation-reinforcing theory
of judicial review, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:ATHEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
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does not necessarily mean that the courts must give an individually satisfyingremedy
to each litigant;21the protection of rights can be promoted as well by judicial doctrine
that facilitates the attention of other branches to constitutionally salient values.22
A critical consideration of standingdecisions thus entails at least the following
constitutional concerns:first, the basic purposes of courts in a constitutional democ-
racy, includingthe protection of rights, either directly or through doctrine that encour-
ages other branches to do so;second, self-limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction
to preserve the courts institutional capacities; and third, self-limitations on the exer-
cise of jurisdiction to allow room for democratic self-governance. As I will suggest,
self-limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction will not necessarily preserve courts
institutional capacities if refusals to adjudicate or allow adjudication contribute to
21 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104HARV. L. REV. 1731(1991).
22 For discussion of the capacity and role of legislatures and other constitutional actors
in interpretingthe Constitution, see, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS (1999);Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,
115YALE L.J. 1346(2006);see also, e.g., Robin West, Toward the Study of the Legislated
Constitution, 72OHIO ST. L.J. 1343(2011). My suggestion that nonjusticiability determi-
nations can sometimes contribute to weakening the accountability and democratic legitimacy
of other branches may be viewed as inconsistent with scholarly arguments that judicial review
itself weakens democratic accountability. See, e.g., Waldron, supra, at 1353(arguingthat judi-
cial review is politically illegitimate, so far as democratic values are concerned, because
it disenfranchises ordinary citizens and brushes aside cherished principles of representation
and political equality in the final resolution of issues about rights); James B. Thayer, The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Judicial Review, 7HARV. L. REV. 129, 15556
(1893) (No doubt our doctrine of constitutional lawhas had a tendency to drive out questions
of justice and right, and to fill the mind of legislators with thoughts of mere legality, of what
the constitution allows. And moreover, even in the matter of legality, they have felt little
responsibility;if we are wrong, they say, the courts will correct it. . . . The checkingand cut-
tingdown of legislative power, by numerous detailed prohibitions in the constitution, cannot
be accomplished without making the government petty and incompetent.); see also Mark
Tushnet, Thayers View: Judicial Review or Democracy, 88NW. U. L. REV. 9(1993)(arguing
that Thayers argument to constrain judicial review, to invalidate laws only when it was beyond
doubt that the statute was unconstitutional, was most concerned with protectingdemocracy
from the debilitatingeffects of more aggressive judicial review);Mark Graber, The Non-
Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 35
(1993) (arguing that legislators sometimes pass the buck to the courts on difficult issues).
Cf. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:THE
PRESIDENCY,THE SUPREME COURT, ANDCONSTITUTIONALLEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 295
(2007)(arguingthat judicial supremacy in interpretingthe Constitution has developed in
important part from decisions of political actors who defer to the Court precisely because
they do not wish to accept the responsibility of deciding these issues themselves; also sug-
gestingthat judicial supremacyhas beenproduced bydecisions of democraticallyelected repre-
sentatives and that U.S. democratic politics might not be better absent the temptation of
judicial supremacy).
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disrespect for the courts fairness and reasoning;23and self-limitation may not advance
democratic self-government if it reinforces or fails to remove obstacles to the workings
of well-functioningconstitutional democracy.
In this Essay I discuss two cases, one from 2013, the other from 1983, that display
somewhat similar misunderstandings of the federal courts role in the U.S. constitu-
tional system. The Courts understanding of its self-developed standing limits in
such decisions as Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,24and City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons,25 is incompatible with some of the most important justifications for the
degree of independence allowed to Article III courts. The Courts vision in these two
cases confuses non-adjudication with appropriate deference to the political branches,
and overlooks the role of adjudication in promptingdemocratic deliberation about
rights protection. Nor are these decisions justifiable by resort to ideas of a disciplined
prudence, or principled discretion, in the timingand posture of adjudication.26
Both cases arguably involved minority interests particularly in need of judicial
scrutiny. In Lyons, the plaintiff was a member of a discriminated-against minority
group, an African American male, chokeholded by Los Angeles police in 1976when
racism was rampant in that department.27In Clapper, although the constitutional rights
claims affected the shared interests of large groups, the plaintiffs grounded their stand-
ingin important part in their role protectingthe legal rights of potential terrorism sus-
pects, in the years followingthe attacks of 9/11.28In this sense, neither set of plaintiffs
could expect a majoritarian political process to fully attend to the asserted invasion of
their rights. In both cases plaintiffs raisingnon-frivolous claims of constitutional rights
violations were denied access to important judicial remedies. These decisions, I will
argue, were both errors in the treatment of the plaintiffs, failingto advance the im-
portant purpose of judicial reviewof providingan impartial forum to evaluate claims
of rights denials by minority groups or persons takingunpopular positions (and those
actingon their behalf).29
23 See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 6.
24 133S. Ct. 1138(2013).
25 461U.S. 95(1983).
26 Bickels concerns about the passive virtues seemed mostly centered on adjudication in
the Supreme Court itself. See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 131 33, 173. But as others have noted,
because justiciability doctrines are generally described by the Court as applyingto all Article III
courts, they lack the flexibility needed to achieve many of Bickels prudential goals. See
Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86TEX.L.REV.73, 10812 (2007) (discussing
the passive virtues). For a further critique of the passive virtues, see Christopher J.
Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97COLUM.L.REV.312, 41617 (1997) (arguing that
prudential passive virtues are inconsistent with concept of litigation as party-driven and
responsive to parties arguments and evidence).
27 See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 9798; id. at 11416 (Marshall, J., dissenting); infra text at
notes 16971.
28 Clapper, 133S. Ct. at 1145.
29 The plaintiffs in Clapper were
attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations whose
work allegedly requires them to engage in sensitive and sometimes
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In both cases, moreover, the body politic may have suffered constitutional and
other harms that might have been avoidable were it not for the Courts self-restraint.
This is particularly evident in Lyons: In the years following the Courts 1983 decision
in that case, the L.A. Police Department continued to visit unjustified physical violence
on its citizens; the physical violence of the Rodney King riots occurred following
acquittal of the LAPD officers involved, notwithstandingthe visual images of their
brutality.30 Some of this unjustified police behavior, and thus some of the physical
violence of the riotingthe Rodney Kingepisode provoked, might have been forestalled
by earlier injunctive relief and related judicial monitoring, had Lyons not essentially
ruled it out through its newstandingrequirements. Of course, whether or not allowing
standingwould have led to further relief against the LAPD, and if so, whether it would
have been effective in disruptingthe culture of racism and violence, are uncertain;but
the failure to allow the possibility of such relief raises hauntingquestions of what
might have been. The Courts decision also stands as a failure to develop doctrine de-
signed to prompt other branches and levels of government proactively to protect rights
as they govern.31
In Clapper, the connection between denyingaccess to the courts and any harm
resulting to the peoples sense of trust and privacy from the surveillance itself, or
harm from unauthorized disclosures of classified material concerningsurveillance by
leakers, is less direct and more contestable. Nonetheless, a potential for harm from
foreclosingadjudication exists. Denyingjusticiability left the constitutionality of a
statute potentially affecting millions of Americans privacy rights unresolved. Denying
justiciability in Clapper may also have added to the felt pressures for unlawful dis-
closures of information, on the view that litigation in court over the constitutionality
of the surveillance would be unavailing.32Denyingjusticiability also passed up op-
portunities for courts to develop legal standards concerningcovert surveillance in this
setting, or to spread on-the-record reliable information about how, in general terms,
the statutory authority was understood by those who implemented it, information that
could be helpful to democratic deliberation.
privileged telephone and e-mail communications with colleagues, clients,
sources, and other individuals located abroad [and who]believe that
some of the people with whom they exchange foreign intelligence infor-
mation are likely targets of surveillance under §1881a.
Id.
30 See James H. Johnson, Jr. & Walter C. Farrell, Jr., The Fire This Time: The Genesis
of the Los Angeles Rebellion of 1992, 71N.C. L. REV. 1403, 140307 (1993).
31 Compare Govt of S. Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding that
the justiciable right to access to housing in South Africas Constitution imposed an obligation
on the government to develop a reasonable plan for meetinghousingneeds but did not entitle
the homeless plaintiffs to specific individual relief), with Rizzo v. Goode, 423U.S. 362(1976)
(dismissingon justiciability, equitable and federalism grounds action to have police depart-
ment placed under judicial supervision focused on its disciplinary mechanisms in order to
prevent future incidents of police abuse).
32 See infra note 132 (describing leaker Snowdens question to his attorney about standing).
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To continue as a constitutional democracy, theremust be sufficient checks, through
law, on the exercises of power, especially where those exercises of power are not fully
transparent. In both Lyons and Clapper the Court missed opportunities, through con-
structions of standing doctrine that were unnecessary (in David Shapiros memorable
phrase, unforced error[s]33)to improve the quality of our democracy by consider-
ingsubstantial claims that important constitutional rights were beingviolated. These
errors, unforced by precedent, may flow from a vision that mistakenly equates judicial
self-restraint with democratic self-governance,34or that values democratic governance
over particular constitutional rights, in circumstances where constitutional democratic
self-governance would have benefitted from allowingadjudications to go forward.
Harm to society from the Courts failure to allow merits adjudication reflects the
second shared error in these cases.
Finally, the Court does not necessarily protect itself institutionally by not deciding;
there are cases it ought to decide or allow to be decided in the lower courts in order
to legitimate the substantial power and independence federal courts enjoy under the
Constitution. The courts do not sit simply to duplicate what legislatures and executives
do;35their special provenance is the protection of rights, and especially the kinds of
constitutional rights asserted by minorities not likely to prevail through purely political
processes not likely, perhaps, even to get on the agendas of elected bodies but
which the courts, generally, have to decide. Refusals to decide claims of constitu-
tional right brought by minorities on justiciability grounds are in tension with one
of the most powerful arguments for havingindependent courts review government
action. The third error shared by these cases, then, is the self-inflicted harm to the
Courts own role in the U.S. Constitutional System.
The legitimacy of the federal courts rests on many factors:the constitutional
provisions securingtheir independence;their longhistory as national symbols;the
courts procedures, and their sense of self-discipline and restraint; the restraint of
other branches and levels of government in dealingwith the courts;the justness and
correctness of their judicial decisions;and the regard for the courts from the legal
33 David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98
HARV.L.REV. 61, 70 (1984) (describing a recent decision by the Court as an unforced error).
34 See, e.g., Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146 (noting that Article III standing law serves to
prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches);
see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (describing Article IIIs concern with
unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in determining standing) (citation and internal quote
marks omitted).
35 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 5859
(2001) (emphasizing how judges constitutionally secured independence, in contrast to elected
representatives constant need to worry about reelection, enables judges to take a longer and
more impartial view of constitutional questions);cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an
Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1700(2008)(arguingthat courts
bring a distinctive perspective that makes them more likely than legislatures to apprehend
serious risks of rights violations in some kinds of cases).
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community, political elites, and from the people.36Especially for the people at large,
the Supreme Court is a symbol, as well as the head, of the federal courts. Yet unlike
European-style constitutional courts, the membership of the Supreme Court is not
renewed on a regular basis;U.S. justices serve unlimited tenures, unlike European
constitutional court judges who are typically replaced after servingsingle terms of
considerably less than a generations span.37Support for the Court turns, in part, on
its beingperceived as an open-minded forum, somehow at once vindicatingdemo-
cratic governance and protectingindividuals and minorities, while resolvingdisputes
and providingjustice under law. Judicial legitimacy also draws strength from the
Courts use of legal processes, and legal reasoning, consistent with the norms of the
broader legal community in which it is situated. The errors reflected in Lyons and
Clapper may work together with other developments including door-closing doc-
trines in civil rights cases and in tort and consumer actions against businesses to
raise concerns about what the Court is for, and with it, questions about its legitimacy
and continued independence.
The standingdecisions in Lyons and Clapper were, then, a triple error. First, the
individuals and organizations involved, members of political or racial minorities, were
remitted to the very majoritarian processes of whose results they complained. In this
sense the cases represent a fundamental failure of the individual rights protecting
role that is so important an aspect of the federal courts responsibilities. Second, for
the body politic, the predictable failures of the political processes to remedy the
complained-of conduct in Lyons may have contributed to very adverse developments
for bona fide social interests in peace, order, and security.38 Clapper was a missed
opportunity to contribute to the development of legal standards for regulatingthe
vitally important yet potentially harmful surveillance practices of the government in
an age of metadata collection. And third, for the Court itself, continuingto close the
doors to litigants pressingthe kinds of constitutional claims on which the courts have
a particularly significant role to play in a democratic constitutional society is incon-
sistent with the longterm institutional interests of the judiciary in beingseen as a
forum for protectingthe rights of all of the people.
Part I discusses Clapper, demonstratinghow it expanded the standingbarrier
beyond prior cases, to the detriment of plaintiffs ability to practice their professions
free from reasonable fear of (assertedly) unlawful surveillance, and of the countrys
understandingof how the Constitution limits (if at all)government surveillance of
innocent persons. Part II discusses Lyons, and its expansion of the law of standing,
36 These factors are not necessarily independent;elite evaluation may depend on the per-
ceived correctness of decisions or candor and persuasiveness of reasoning;popular opinion
may interact with that of elected representatives.
37 In Germany, constitutional court judges serve for twelve-year nonrenewable terms;in
France, members of the Conseil Constitutionnel serve for nine-year nonrenewable terms.
JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 16, at 498.
38 See infra Part II.
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as Richard Fallon argued long ago, by replacing the mootness doctrines emphasis on
a showingthat past unlawful behavior will not recur with a standingdoctrine require-
ment to show that past unlawful behavior will recur to affect the particular plaintiff.39
This change works to the detriment of individuals injured by police misconduct and
to the detriment of the broader society that was afflicted by the harms caused by racist
police brutality and ensuingmob violence. Part III addresses potential harm to the
Courts legitimacy from its reliance on threshold barriers to public adjudication in the
federal courts, includingbut not limited to standingdoctrine, havingin mind from
a comparative perspective the particular institutional structure of the Supreme Court.
I. CLAPPER:STANDING TO CHALLENGE MASSIVE SECRET SURVEILLANCE
Clapper was an unforced error in the direction of tightening standards for
standingin order to avoid decidingon the constitutionality of a new program of mass
surveillance claimed to pose a particular threat to the privacy of plaintiffs commu-
nications. In the extremity of its insistence on the certainty of future injury,40Clapper
goes beyond the requirements for standingapplied in other arguably analogous cases.
Its approach may be contrasted with United States v. Windsor,41 decided the same
Term, in which the Court arguablyrelaxed Article III case-or-controversy requirements
in light of the interests in resolvingthe unconstitutionality of the federal Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA). The Courts choice to deny justiciability in Clapper did not
advance self-governance and cannot be squared with the fundamental rights-protecting
role of the Article III judiciary.
A. A Prefatory Note: Windsor and Clapper Compared
In United States v. Windsor, the Court upheld the Article III standingof the United
States to seek review of a judgment, with which the United States agreed, upholding
an individuals constitutional challenge to DOMA.42 (I served as Court-appointed
amica curiae in Windsor, arguing, at the request of the Court, that the governments
agreement with the court below deprived the Supreme Court of jurisdiction and that
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG)of the House of Representatives lacked
Article III standing.)43In Windsor, there was no need for appellate review to protect
39 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6, 2430 (1984).
40 See Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (stating that future
harm must be certainly impending).
41 133S. Ct. 2675(2013);see infra notes 4255 and accompanying text.
42 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 268689.
43 I was appointed by the Court and served pro bono as amica curiae for the purpose of
arguingthe above two points. In this unusual role, I sought to make the best, most respon-
sible arguments for each position the Court asked me to argue. I do not here evaluate the
correctness of these two arguments (on which I may write in the future), but focus rather on
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the rights of the individual litigant, who could recover the taxes owed her under the
district court judgment.44 The injury to the Government the need to pay a tax
refund was not one the Government sought to remedy on appeal; rather, it sought
an affirmance.45 But interests in the settlement of an important question of federal
constitutional law affectingmany people were plainly at stake;respondent Windsor
supported the Courts jurisdiction, and in doing so noted the interests of many other
same-sexmarried couples who were disadvantaged by the federal law.46
In upholdingthe governments standing under Article III to pursue appellate
review in Windsor, the Court could have articulated a distinct framework for govern-
ment appeals. Given the peculiar nature of sovereign interests, one could readily imag-
ine such an argument beingmade.47Instead, the Court purported to apply ordinary
Article III standards for determiningstanding.
the Courts different attitude toward relaxing or tightening standing requirements found in
Windsor and Clapper.
44 Had appellate reviewbeen denied, the district court judgment, once final, would have
been payable through standingappropriations for the TaxJudgment Funds and plaintiff could
have collected on her judgment. See Reply Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae on
Jurisdiction at 9n.9, United States v. Windsor, 133S. Ct. 2675(2013)(No. 12-307);see also
31U.S.C. §1304(establishingthe judgment fund, a permanent indefinite appropriation to
pay judgments entered against the United States that are not payable from other sources);31
U.S.C. §1324(establishingindefinite appropriation to be used to pay taxrefunds).
45 Windsor, 133S. Ct. at 2686.
46 See Brief on the Jurisdictional Questions for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 11,
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (noting harmful uncertainty
for Ms. Windsor and hundreds of thousands of others).
47 The injuries that a government pursues in a criminal prosecution, for example, are not
personal to the government but go to the governments interests in vindicating the law; an
interest in vindicatingthe law is not sufficient for standingfor a private person. It was an in-
terest in vindicating the law of the Constitution, and, if it were constitutional, of the DOMA
statute that presumably contributed to the governments decision to seek review in Windsor.
On the application (vel non)of Article III doctrine on standingto suits by the federal gov-
ernment, see, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal
Prosecutions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places,
97MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2245 (1999) ([N]o federal judge, if pressed, would seriously contend
that Article III requires that the United States must suffer an injury in fact that is personal,
concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical before
litigation on its behalf can be brought in federal court. And no federal judge would contend
that injury to the United States be more than an abstract . . . injury to the interest in seeing
that the law is obeyed . . . .); Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First
Amendment, 103MICH. L. REV. 589, 627 (2005) (Federal courts regularly adjudicate govern-
ment enforcement actions that would lack injury in fact if brought by private plaintiffs.);
cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 51821 (2007) (stating that States are not normal
litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction and suggesting that the fact that party
plaintiff and petitioner was a sovereign state allowed some relaxation of the standard to meet
Article III standingrequirements). For an argument defendingdifferent standingrequirements
for executive branch and private parties, see Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II
Nondelegation Doctrine, 11U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 78284 (2009).
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As the Court summarized Article IIIs familiar standing requirements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of the injury has to be
fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not . . . th[e]result [of]the independent action of some third
party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.48
Havingembraced this established three-part test, however, the Court acted as though
the true test was whether the government had a stake in the decision, and concluded
that it did:
[The government]retains a stake sufficient to support Article III
jurisdiction on appeal and in proceedings before this Court. The
judgment in question orders the United States to pay Windsor
the refund she seeks. An order directingthe Treasury to pay
money is a real and immediate economic injury, indeed as real
and immediate as an order directingan individual to pay a tax.
That the Executive may welcome this order to pay the refund if it
is accompanied by the constitutional rulingit wants does not
eliminate the injury to the national Treasury if payment is made,
or to the taxpayer if it is not. The judgment orders the United
States to pay money that it would not disburse but for the courts
order. The Government of the United States has a valid legal
argument that it is injured even if the Executive disagrees with
§3of DOMA . . . .49
48 Windsor, 133S. Ct. at 268586 (emphasis added) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992) (footnote and citations omitted)).
49 Windsor, 133S. Ct. at 2686(citation omitted). In this passage, which seemingly distin-
guishes the Government of the United States from the Executive, there is implicit recog-
nition that the government, as a party litigant, has more complex, multi-hatted interests than
ordinary litigants. One might reason that the interest of the government in terms of the cor-
rect application of constitutional law led it to seek affirmance;its interest in protectingthe
Treasury its financial interests as the Court saw it, gave it standing to appeal from the
judgment with which the Government agreed. The Court remarks on two other interests that
supported exercising jurisdiction (that also might have motivated the governments position)
an interest in vindicating the Supreme Courts primary role in determining the constitutionality
of a law that has inflicted real injury on a plaintiff and in avoiding the threats to separation
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The Court did not fully explain how a decision reversing the order below
which would redress this economic injury could be regarded as a favorable
decision, when the government had argued the decision below should be affirmed.
But the Court did note the prudential problems posed by the governments position and
its absence of adversity to the plaintiff, which problems, it held, were redressed by the
vigorous advocacy provided by BLAG, whose independent standingto sue the major-
ity did not address.50In treatingthe requirement of adversity, a fundamental aspect of
justiciability,51as one satisfied by an amicus, in a case where the parties agree with the
judgment below, the Court arguably expanded the scope of case or controversy.52
What may have been driving the decision to exercise jurisdiction was the Courts
perception of the interests beyond those of the immediate parties in resolving the
issue, which it treated as prudential factors bearingon justiciability:
Were this Court to hold that prudential rules require it to dismiss
the case . . . ,[53]extensive litigation would ensue. The district
of powers from a precedent for unilateral executive nullif[ication] of a federal statute. Id.
at 2688.
50 Id. at 2688 ([T]he prudential and Article III requirements are met here; and, as a con-
sequence, the Court need not decide whether BLAG would have standingto challenge the
District Courts ruling and its affirmance in the Court of Appeals on BLAGs own authority.).
51 Cf. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, supra note 26, at 13435 (arguing that of the jus-
tifications for standingdoctrine only the interest in adversity was of true functional signifi-
cance, and it did not require the kind of injury requirement on which the Court had insisted).
52 In only two prior cases of which I am aware did the Court exercise jurisdiction over
an appeal by the United States from a lower court findinga statute unconstitutional, where
the United States agreed that the statute was unconstitutional and sought affirmance. See INS
v. Chadha, 462U.S. 919(1983);United States v. Lovett, 328U.S. 303(1946). In Chadha,
the Houses of Congress were considered interveningparties and they defended the legislative
veto in the challenged statute;the Court did not decide whether the issues would have been
justiciable absent participation of the intervenors. 426U.S. at 931n.6, 939. In Lovett, no
party or amicus objected to the justiciability of the claim on grounds of lack of adversity. (Not
infrequently, the Court has appointed amicus to argue in defense of an otherwise undefended
judgment below, see Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend
Abandoned Lower Court Decisions, 63STAN. L.REV. 907(2011), but in such cases the parties
are generally adverse to the judgment below.)Windsor thus appears to be the first clear deci-
sion by the Court that an appeal by a party, who agreed with both the judgment belowand with
the only other party, met adversity requirements through participation by an amicus.
53 The Court assumed that if it reversed for lack of standing, in consequence, [it would
follow] that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to dismiss it as well. Windsor, 133S. Ct.
at 2688. But cf. Brief of Court-Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing Jurisdiction at 3337,
United States v. Windsor, 133S. Ct. 2675(2013)(No. 12-307)(suggestingthat even if the
Court found for prudential reasons that the government lacked standingbefore it, the Court
of Appeals judgment could survive because of the greater importance of the exercise of juris-
diction over cases under 28U.S.C. §1291(which makes jurisdiction mandatory)than of the
Supreme Courts exercising its discretionary certiorari jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254).
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courts in 94districts throughout the Nation would be without
precedential guidance not only in taxrefund suits but also in cases
involving the whole of DOMAs sweep involving over 1,000 fed-
eral statutes and a myriad of federal regulations. . . . Rights and
privileges of hundreds of thousands of persons would be adversely
affected, pendinga case in which all prudential concerns about
justiciability are absent. That numerical prediction may not be
certain, but it is certain that the cost in judicial resources and
expense of litigation for all persons adversely affected would be
immense. True, the very extent of DOMAs mandate means that
at some point a case likely would arise without the prudential con-
cerns raised here;but the costs, uncertainties, and alleged harm and
injuries likely would continue for a time measured in years before
the issue is resolved. In these unusual and urgent circumstances,
the very term prudential counsels that it is a proper exercise of
the Courts responsibility to take jurisdiction.54
Thus, apart from viewingWindsor as reflectingthe special role of government in
litigation, the Courts arguable relaxation of the standard Article III requirements for
standing can be understood also in the context of the Courts appreciation of how
many people (hundreds of thousands) and cases were affected by the issue, and
(perhaps)its perception of how unfair it would be to force people to continue to suffer
the stigma and adverse effects of a law that a majority believed unconstitutionally
discriminated against same-sexcouples. But the Windsor Courts concern for the ad-
verse effects of years of costs, uncertainties, and alleged harms was not extended
to the plaintiffs, or those they stood for, in Clapper.55
B. Clapper and Tightened Standards for Standing in Challenges to
Secret Surveillance
If in Windsor the Court relaxed Article III standingrequirements, in Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA the Court added stringency to its more usual articulation
54 Windsor, 133S. Ct. at 2688.
55 Of course, many Supreme Court cases will affect large numbers of nonparties. Clappers
negation of standingmeans fewer cases in the future, in contrast to the many pendingindividual
cases the Court contemplated in Windsor. But the number of persons affected by the challenged
government practices in Clapper may be as great, or even greater, than in Windsor. Yet there
may be other differences, not explicitly referred to in Windsor, nor embraced within the stated
tests for standing, that further account for the difference in treatment of such prudential factors
includingthe nature of the harm caused by the claimed constitutional violation (including, in
Windsor, DOMAs effects across many areas of federal law), the victims awareness vel non
of the harm, and/or the degree of certainty that there was a constitutional violation.
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of the requirements for Article III standing and especially for the injury compo-
nent at its core. In so doing, it failed to appreciate the increased importance of judicial
review when secret government surveillance is at issue.
1. Special Importance of Judicial Review to Determine Legality of Secret
Surveillance Programs
When a government in a democracy seeks to act in secret, the need for judicial
review of the legality of statutes authorizingthe secrecy should be deemed especially
pressing. The United States government needs to conduct surveillance and gather
intelligence, some of which must be covert, in order to fulfill a basic government
function of protectingits people from attack. But these legitimate, even compelling
needs for secrecy do not preclude judicial reviewof the infrastructure through which
such covert activity occurs, to assure respect for constitutional rights. Indeed, the
secrecy of the operations makes more pressingthe need for judicial review of the
constitutionality of the framework.
In 2008, Congress enacted an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA), creating
new procedures for the authorization of foreign intelligence sur-
veillance targeting nonUnited States persons located outside the
United States. . . . [I]n contrast to the preexisting FISA scheme,
[Section 702]does not require the government to submit an indi-
vidualized application to the FISC identifying the particular tar-
gets or facilities to be monitored. Instead, the Attorney General
(AG) and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) apply for
a mass surveillance authorization by submittingto the FISC a
written certification and supportingaffidavits attestinggenerally
that a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign
intelligence information and that that information will be ob-
tained from or with the assistance of an electronic communica-
tion service provider.56
The statute also requires a certification that the procedures are designed to minimize
the acquisition and retention of data, consistent with the need of the United States
to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.57
Plaintiffs in Clapper brought a facial challenge to the 2008amendment, alleging
that it violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights, as well as guarantees under
Article III and separation of powers principles. In three respects the amended statute
56 Amnesty Intl USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 124(2d Cir. 2011)(emphasis added).
This Second Circuit decision on standingwas reversed in Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133
S. Ct. 1138(2013).
57 See Clapper, 683F.3d at 123n.5;see also 50U.S.C. §§1881a, 1802(d), 1821(4).
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differed importantly from prior law:in the breadth of surveillance authorized (for
example, a large geographic area could be targeted);in no longer requiringa showing
that a foreign power was the object of the surveillance;and in removingthe FISA
court fromits role in monitoringongoingcompliancewith minimization requirements.58
Plaintiffs alleged that their jobs required them to engage in sensitive international
communications which they feared would be surveilled under this new Act, to pro-
tect against which they were takingcostly and burdensome measures to protect the
confidentiality of communications.59
The government argued that only persons who showed that they had been sur-
veilled under these procedures had standingto sue. The Second Circuit disagreed, con-
cluding that plaintiffs had shown a sufficient likelihood that they would be surveilled
in the future to meet the injury requirement, and also concludingthat the expenditures
and burdensome procedures plaintiffs were followingto avoid surveillance constituted
a present injury for Article III purposes.60
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding, 54, that the plaintiffs lacked standing.61
The Courts refusal to allow their claims to be adjudicated removed an important check
for securing constitutional rights. That there may be aspects of the programs imple-
mentation that would need to remain confidential to be effective should not have led
the Court to be more willingto find challenges nonjusticiable, given the importance
of oversight of constitutionality and the exparte and nonadversarial character of the
proceedings in the FISA court.
It is because of the necessary secrecy of government operations to obtain foreign
intelligence that the plaintiffs could not say, with absolute certainty, that they were
beingsurveilled;only in unsuccessful covert surveillances could such a plaintiff
emerge. Yet the growth of covert surveillance systems by governments can have per-
nicious effects on democracy, the rule of law, and constitutionalism. Executive branch
officials have incentives to over-collect, and over-retain, data;62files can be misused
by those who lawfully hold them;data can be inadvertently leaked. In light of the im-
portance of assuringthat the rule of law is complied with, and especially when rights
of individuals are at stake, the secrecy of these programs should be understood to
provide special reason for judicial review.63
58 See Clapper, 133S. Ct. at 1156;Brief for Respondents at 11, 30, in Clapper v. Amnesty
Intl USA, No. 11-1025, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
59 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 114243.
60 Clapper, 638F.3d at 134, 136, 138.
61 Clapper, 133S. Ct. at 1143.
62 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542U.S. 507, 545(2004)(Souter, J., concurringin part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (For reasons of inescapable human nature,
the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which
to rest the Nations entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost
in liberty on the way to victory;the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim
that security legitimately raises.).
63 Cf., e.g., Kennedy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26839/05, 2010Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶119
(18 May 2010) ([I]n recognition of the particular features of secret surveillance measures
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The reasoningof the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)on this point is
worthy of consideration.64Ordinarily, applicants before the EctHR, like plaintiffs in-
vokingthe jurisdiction of an Article III court, must show that they are harmed by (the
victim of) the government action they seek to challenge and cannot bring abstract
challenges. Over a series of cases involving challenges to governments covert sur-
veillance and data collection programs, however, the ECtHR has held that individuals
need show only a reasonable likelihood not a certainty of having been subject to
covert surveillance to challenge its legality, or need show only that they are in a group
at risk of being subjected to surveillance under a statute in order to challenge the
statutes validity.65 The modified standard reflected facts about covert operations:
and the importance of ensuringeffective control and supervision of them, the Court has per-
mitted general challenges to the relevant legislative regime.). This was a unanimous decision
by a seven-judge panel.
64 See supra note 63. The ECtHR has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims, under the European
Convention on Human Rights, against forty-seven member states including all members
of the European Union. It is widely regarded as the most successful human rights tribunal
in the world. Article 8of the European Convention on Human Rights, at issue in the line of
cases discussed in text, provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
home and correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the lawand is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economicwell-beingof the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. Article 8s core right, set forth in section 1, encompasses rights of
privacy and protection fromintrusion on the home, private life and correspondence embodied
in the U.S. Due Process clauses (under the Griswold/Roe/Lawrence line of cases)and the
Fourth Amendment. Although there are many differences between the statutory schemes at
issue in Kennedy and in Clapper, there is nothing in the ECtHRs reasoning in Kennedy v.
U.K. that turns on the specific language of Article 8as compared to the U.S. Constitution.
Indeed, other ECtHR decisions under Article 8have been noted and relied on by the U.S.
Supreme Court in resolvingsubstantive due process questions. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 573, 576 (2003) (referring to ECtHRs decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom).
65 Kennedy, 2010Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶¶122, 128;Iordachi v. Moldova, App. No. 25198//02
(Eur. Ct. H.R.) (Sept. 14, 2009), ¶¶ 3334 (concerning lawyers who claimed they were at risk
of surveillance in speakingto clients who could be targeted for surveillance under national
law);see also Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/76(6September 1978), Series A no. 28(Eur.
Ct. Hum. Rts.), ¶¶ 3438, 41. The reasonable likelihood standard concerning claimed inci-
dents of surveillance is similar to that applied by the Court of Appeals in Clapper with respect
to the likelihood of surveillance under the newstatute. See Clapper, 638F.3d at 134. At least
one amicus brief in Clapper brought ECtHR case law to the Supreme Courts attention. See
Brief of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, et al., In Support of Respondents, Clapper
v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (No. 11-1025) (discussingIordachi, Klass,
and Lambert v. France).
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In applying the reasonable likelihood standard, for example, the ECtHR make[s]
its assessment in light of all the circumstances of the case and will not limit its re-
viewto the existence of direct proof that surveillance has taken place given that such
proof is generally difficult or impossible to obtain.66The distinctiveness of covert
action, then, leads to a realignment of the standards for determining a challengers
status as victim entitled to invoke the ECtHRs jurisdiction.
In one recent decision invoking the reasonable likelihood and member of a group
at particular risk standards, the ECtHR, in an opinion by President (Fourth Section)
Lech Garlicki,67explained its reasons for more relaxed standards for allowingchal-
lenges to covert surveillance:
Sight should not be lost of the special reasons justifyingthe
Courts departure, in cases concerning secret measures, from its
general approach which denies individuals the right to challenge
a law in abstracto. The principal reason was to ensure that the
secrecy of such measures did not result in the measures being
effectively unchallengeable and outside the supervision of the
national judicial authorities and the Court . . . . In order to assess,
in a particular case, whether an individual can claim an interfer-
ence as a result of the mere existence of legislation permitting
secret surveillance measures, the Court must have regard to the
availability of any remedies at the national level and the risk of
secret surveillance measures beingapplied to him. Where there
is no possibility of challengingthe alleged application of secret
surveillance measures at domestic level, widespread suspicion
and concern amongthe general public that secret surveillance
powers are beingabused cannot be said to be unjustified. In such
cases, even where the actual risk of surveillance is low, there is
a greater need for scrutiny by this Court.68
The interest in assuring that the secrecy of such measures did not result in [their
being] effectively unchallengeable is relevant to U.S. standing law, notwithstanding
66 Kennedy, 2010Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶123.
67 Garlicki served as a constitutional lawprofessor in Poland and as a Justice on the Polish
Constitutional Court before his appointment to the ECtHR. His term on the ECtHR expired in
2012. He has more recently been a visitingprofessor of lawat NYU LawSchool, see https://
www.facebook.com/ConstitutionalTransitions (Meet Lech Garlicki, Visiting CT Fellow for
Fall 2013 and Global Professor at NYU Law.) and at Yale Law School, see http://www.law
.yale.edu/faculty/16984.htm.
68 Kennedy, 2010Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶124(citation omitted);see id. at ¶¶ 125 (reasonable
likelihood), 128 (particular risk).
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that laws interest in allowing political processes to address generalized grievances,
because concrete harm to individual rights may go unremedied, as the covert nature
of the activity means that it may not be recognized as a grievance at all even if spe-
cific individuals private communications are unlawfully intercepted. Judge Garlickis
second argument that where there is no possibility of challenge, suspicion of abuse
cannot be said to be unjustified is also of salience in the United States, where the
judicial review provisions of FISA fail to provide for challenges by those who believe
themselves subject to surveillance (or others actingon their behalf).69
Thus, the fact that a program of covert surveillance, not previously reviewed by
public proceedings in Article III courts, was involved should not have been an
occasion for Clapper to ratchet up the standing inquiry in ways likely to preclude
judicial review. If anything, more relaxed standards should have been applied. As
the experience in European democracies suggests, judicial review of the constitu-
tionality of covert surveillance programs is not inconsistent with maintaininghigh
levels of secrecy. In many cases before the ECtHR the national measures are up-
held.70 But the ECtHR has emphasized the importance of clear, detailed rules on
the subject, especially as the technology available for use is continually becoming
more sophisticated.71
Indeed, the greater protections afforded against abusive data collection and re-
tention in Europe may improve both appropriate data sharingand data security by
69 The FISA court exists primarily to review and approve government applications for
warrants and does not permit those subject to surveillance to challenge the surveillance.
[E]lectronic service providers and business order recipients, who receive FISA orders to
collect and turn over information, may challenge those orders, and the government may appeal
denials of authorization requests. See Overview of the FISC, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy
/terrorism/fisa/fisc.html#Overview(last visited Oct. 23, 2014). However, serviceprovidershave
little incentive to challenge because they are immunized from liability by 50U.S.C. §1805(h).
Media reports identifyonly a single (and unsuccessful)challenge by a service provider, brought
in 2007, by Yahoo. See Harley Geiger, Yahoo Court Documents Reveal Pitched Battle Over
Surveillance Power, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY &TECHNOLOGY (Sept. 12, 2014), https://cdt
.org/blog/yahoo-court-documents-reveal-pitched-battle-over-surveillance-power (also noting
heavy fines that Yahoo was threatened with).
70 IncludinginKennedy v.UnitedKingdom, thecase quoted above, and in Klass v. Germany
(1978), one of the earliest of the ECtHRs decision in this area. Of course, one cannot exclude
the possibility that adjudicatingthese cases simply gives a patina of lawfulness to covert
activities not in fact subject to effective review. And it is true that there is much we cannot
know. But we can observe that for decades European countries that are party to the ECtHR
have allowed challenges on the merits to data collection to be brought by parties who can show
a likelihood, but not a certainty, that they themselves are surveilled.
71 Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85, 176-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)at ¶33(1990);see
also Kopp v. Switzerland, App. No. 13/1997/797/1000, 1998-11Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶72(1998)
(indicating that interception of telephone conversations constitute[s] a serious interference
with private life that must be precisely regulated by law).
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creatinga greater sense of control by law.72While it is for the most part only specu-
lation to consider the motivations of leakers of U.S. data, the absence of judicial re-
view of the legality of these massive programs may have contributed to such unlawful
actions as the denial of justice in the state courts in the Rodney King matter may
have contributed to the unlawful mob violence that followed.73That such behavior is
unlawful does not mean one should ignore the possible connections between denial
of judicial recourse and the felt pressures to resort to unlawful means.
In opposition to the argument that there is enhanced need for judicial reviewof the
constitutionality of statutes authorizingcovert surveillances, it might be suggested that
U.S. standinglaw has traditionally disfavored judicial review of activities justified by
claims of national security. In Laird v. Tatum,74the Court rejected a claim for stand-
ingbased on the possibility that First Amendment rights would be chilled. Professor
Fallon has suggested that the opinion in Clapper can best be understood in the spe-
cial context of intelligence and national security surveillance, as in Tatum, where
the Court has demanded elevated showings of likely injury by parties seeking injunc-
tive relief from policies that relate closely to national security.75 Professor Fallons
72 Cf., e.g., Mark Scott, Irked by N.S.A., Germany Cancels Deal With Verizon, N.Y.TIMES,
June 27, 2014, at B2(reportingthat Germany was cancellingits contract with the U.S. firm,
Verizon Communications, part of the fallout from continuing revelations by Edward J.
Snowden, a former National Security Agency contractor, and noting that as public upset over
Snowdens revelations mounted, Europes own cellphone carriers, like Deutsche Telekom,
have been promoting their European roots and the fact that they comply with Europes
stringent data protection rules to win business from American competitors).
73 See infra note 132(concerningstatement attributed to Snowden). In October 2011, the
FISA court itself had found illegal activity by the NSA in its procedures for retention of wholly
domestic communications. This ruling, however, was not made public until August 2013,
after the Snowden revelations and in part as a result of a FOIA lawsuit. See Ellen Nakashima,
NSA Gathered Thousands of Americans E-mails Before Court Ordered It To Revise its




75 Fallon, Fragmentation, supra note 12(mss. of Sept. 8, 2014, at 25). Of the cases
Professor Fallon cites in this category, only two Tatum and Clapper relate to government
surveillance of private persons. The other two cases cited by Professor Fallon in this category,
see id. at n.157, are United States v. Richardson, 418U.S. 166(1974)and Schlesinger v.
Reservist Committee To Stop the War, 418U.S. 208(1974). See also Fallon, Realism, supra
note 12, at 110n.31. In Schlesinger, the Court held that a citizen and taxpayer lacked standing
to challenge the reserve membership of members of Congress in the military in asserted viola-
tion of Article I Section 6. The issue was connected to national security only remotely, if at all.
Likewise, the issue in Richardson was again raised by a taxpayer/citizen, arguingthat a stat-
ute limitingthe details of public reportingabout the CIA budget was inconsistent with the
Statement of Accounts Clause of Article I Section 9clause 7. See 418 U.S. at 16869. In both
cases, the challenger was someone who claimed no special injury by virtue of the challenged
program, unlike the plaintiffs in Clapper.
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observation may well be correct as a positive matter. But Clapper is distinguishable
from prior case lawinvolvinggovernment surveillance, principally Tatum (whatever
its merits),76and thus Clapper is subject to critique as an unnecessary extension.
In Tatum, plaintiffs alleged that an Army program of gathering information, by
lawful means, about participation in political events would have a chilling effect
on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.77As the D.C. Circuit described, the
Tatum plaintiffs freely admit that they complain of no specific action of the Army
against them, a point emphasized also by the Second Circuit in Clapper.78Plaintiffs
in Clapper, by contrast, asserted that the allegedly unlawful program was already
havingan adverse and costly effect on their present conduct of their professions.79
The Court in Tatum was at pains to emphasize the absence of any claim that the
information gathering was itself unlawful, noting the militarys reliance largely on
publicly available resources.80 And in its closingparagraph the Court implied that
injunctive relief might be available in future cases involving unlawful activities:
there is nothing in our Nations history or in this Courts decided cases, including our
holdingtoday, that can properly be seen as givingany indication that actual or threat-
ened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military would go unnoticed or
unremedied.81 In rejectingstandingfor plaintiffs who had concrete and objective
reasons to believe that their communications with identified persons abroad would
be subject to surveillance that was itself unlawful, and who thus alleged actual or
76 Tatum was itself subject to vigorous dissents. See Tatum, 408U.S. at 16(Douglas,
J., dissentingwith Marshall, J.);id. at 38(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J. and
Marshall, J.).
77 Tatum, 408U.S. at 3. Judge MacKinnon of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit noted that [plaintiffs] are not people, obviously, who are cowed and chilled . . . .
Tatum v. Laird, 444F.2d 947, 959(D.C. Cir. 1971)(MacKinnon, J., concurringin part and
dissentingin part), revd, Laird v. Tatum, 408U.S. 1(1972).
78 Tatum, 444F.2d at 953;accord Tatum, 408U.S. at 3;see Amnesty Intl USA v.
Clapper, 638 F.3d at 146 (They did not claim that they, or anyone with whom they regularly
interacted, would be subject to any illegal or unconstitutional intrusion if the program they
challenged was allowed to continue. Rather, they claimed only that they might be injured if
the information lawfully collected by the military were misused in some unspecified way at
some unspecified point in the future, and they alleged that the surveillance scheme had a
chillingeffect, while essentially admittingthat they themselves had not been chilled, and that
the program had not altered their behavior in any way.).
79 Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 114546 (2013).
80 Tatum, 408 U.S. at 9 (noting the D.C. Circuits conclusions that [t]here is no evidence
of illegal or unlawful surveillance activities. We are not cited to any clandestine intrusion by
a military agent. So far as is yet shown, the information gathered is nothingmore than a good
newspaper reporter would be able to gather by attendance at public meetings and the clipping
of articles from publications available on any newsstand. (internal quotation marks omitted)).
But see id. at 27(Douglas, J., dissenting)(arguingthe dangers of allowingthe military to en-
gage in any surveillance of civilian activities and referringto surveillance measures as in-
cluding infiltrating undercover agents and impersonating journalists).
81 Id. at 16.
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threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the executive branch, Clapper
went beyond the holdingin Tatum, or other national security standing cases, thereby
expandingthe area of nonjusticiability.82At the least, one could conclude, Clapper
could have responsibly distinguished Tatum.
2. Clapper Involved an Extension of StandingPrecedents PrecludingReview
As articulated in Windsor, and many other cases, the key Article III requirement
is for an injury that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. In Clapper,
however, the Court held that for Article III purposes an injury must be certainly
impending, following the argument in the Governments Brief that equated those two
formulations of the injury requirement.83 Under so absolute a standard, injunctive
relief against feared future harm would rarely be available.
Certainly Impending as Inapposite Standard: The Court drew this language
of certainly impending harm from Whitmore v. Arkansas,84 a case involvingthe
82 Cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413U.S. 1, 3, 5(1973)(holdingnonjusticiable a request, in
the aftermath of the Kent State shootings, for injunctive and supervisory relief to assure
adequacy of National Guard training, weaponry and orders and to restrain leaders of the
National Guard from future violation of students constitutional rights). Five members of
the Court joined an opinion statingthat it was not reachingthe question of mootness but
found the requested relief nonjusticiable in the circumstances of the case, which included its
possible mootness and the significant changes in procedures already undertaken by the Ohio
National Guard since the shootings. Id. at 612. Four justices who dissented would have
found the case moot. Id. at 12(dissentingopinion). The majority relied importantly on the
detailed, specific provisions of the Constitutions Militia Clauses, providing that Congress
would provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, while the states had
authority to train accordingto the discipline prescribed by Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§8, cl. 16. The majority relied not only on the specificity of the delegation to Congress and
the states (an important factor under the political question doctrine), and the possible moot-
ness of the claim, but the possible lack of standingof the plaintiffs. See id. at 10(referring
to the infirmity of the posture of respondents as to standing). The majority also emphasized
the advisory nature of the declaration sought and stated that we neither hold nor imply that
the conduct of the National Guard is always beyond judicial review or that there may not be
accountability in a judicial forum for violations of lawfor specific unlawful conduct by military
personnel, whether by way of damages or injunctive relief. Id. at 1112 (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added).
83 See Clapper, 133S. Ct. at 1143;Brief for Petitioners at 1819, Clapper v. Amnesty
Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (No. 11-1025).
84 495U.S. 149, 158(1990). Whitmore in turn cited Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442U.S.
289, 298(1979)(quotingPennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262U.S. 553, 593(1923)), as its
source for the certainly impending standard. Babbitt, however, did not use the phrase
certainly impending as a minimal requirement for standing. Rather, Babbitts standard was
that a party must face a realistic danger of sustaininga direct injury as a result of the
statutes operation or enforcement. Babbitt, 442U.S. at 298(emphasis added). It was in the
next sentence that the Babbitt Court quoted a passage from Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
which concerned the availability of anticipatory relief (not justiciability, which had been
addressed in a prior section of the opinion, see Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262U.S. at
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asserted standingof one death rowinmate to challenge the execution of another. The
petitioner there had argued that he had an interest in not allowing the other inmates
execution to go forward because it would weaken his own eventual claim that the
death penalty was cruel and unusual. The facts in Whitmore seem remote from those
in Clapper, in which the plaintiffs alleged facts about their own activities and contacts
to support their claim that they themselves were likely to be subjected to surveillance
under the program. But the Clapper Court held that because the plaintiffs could not
say with certainty that they were, or were about to be, subject to surveillance, they
failed the injury requirement.85
The certainly impending standard applied in Clapper seems more rigorous than
the standardapplied in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,86
where the claim of injury accepted by the Court included the objectively reasonable
present fear and apprehension regarding the effect of the increased radioactivity in
air, land and water upon [appellees]and their property, and the genetic effects upon
their descendants.87In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,88a majority of the members of
the Court would apparently have upheld plaintiffs standing to challenge the process by
which agency decisions were made to fund projects abroad that might threaten endan-
gered species, had the plaintiffs purchased tickets for trips to those areas89 although
591): But [o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain
preventative relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough. Babbitt, 442U.S.
at 298(alteration in original)(quotingPennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262U.S. at 593). In
context, this quotation was used to illustrate what is enough for preventative relief, and not
wholly to define a standard for future injuries for Article III standingpurposes. Indeed, Babbitt
followed this reference by explainingthat what is needed to establish standingto challenge a
criminal statute proscribing conduct the plaintiff intends to engage in is a credible threat
of prosecution thereunder, which cannot be established [w]hen plaintiffs do not claim that
they have ever been threatened with prosecution, that prosecution is likely, or even that prose-
cution is remotely possible . . . . Id. at 29899 (emphasis added) (quoting Younger v. Harris,
401U.S. 37, 42(1971)). The Babbitt Court was no more suggestingthat the injury must be
certainly impending than it was suggesting that it would be sufficient if a prosecution were
only remotely possible.
85 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 114850. The Court also observed that the challenged statute
merely authorizes but does not require, surveillance, so the statutes mere existence does not
afford a basis for standing. Id. at 1149. But see infra note 124and accompanyingtext.
86 438U.S. 59(1978).
87 Id. at 73(alteration in original)(emphasis added).
88 504U.S. 555(1992). Lujan is one of the unusual cases in which the Court refers to the
certainly impending language of Whitmore, see Lujan, at 564n.2, but even Lujan more often
uses the actual or imminent language that is the more common formulation. See id;id. at
560, 564. The words actual or imminent to describe the injury required by Article III standing
doctrine are far more commonly used than the words certainly impending: a Westlaw
Search, of Supreme Court Cases, on September 13, 2014, for actual w/2 imminent and date
after 1/1/1990 (the year of Whitmore), yielded 33 cases; in the same time period, a search
for certainly w/2 impending yielded 9 cases.
89 Three members of the Court in Lujan believed that plaintiffs already had standingto
challenge agency failures to consult with the Interior Department concerningU.S.-funded
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uncertainties would have remained concerningthe effect of better procedures on the
fundingdecision, the effect of fundingdecisions on the projects, the effect of the
projects on the environment, and whether the plaintiffs ability actually to view the
animals was likely even in the absence of the project or how it would be affected if
the projects went forward. Clappers certainly impending standard is also far more
demanding than the actual or imminent injury standard applied, for example, in
Massachusetts v. EPA, where, the Court found, the risk of climate change, to-
gether with a present rise in sea levels of between five and ten centimeters, met the
Article III injury requirements.90 It is hard to understand why the plaintiffs allegations
in Clapper including the likelihood that, given their overseas contacts and clients,
their communications would be subject to data collection and their havingpresently
incurred expenditures to avoid surveillance of confidential conversations91 do not
manifest a sufficiently stronglikelihood that they would be subject to the surveillance
of which they were complaining. And given the nature of covert surveillance its
necessity in, but risks to, constitutional democracies such a strong likelihood should
have been regarded as a sufficiently concrete and present injury, as were the likeli-
hoods of harm in the environmental cases.
The Role of Plaintiffs Own Actions or Situation:In affirmative action cases, the
Court has allowed relaxed requirements for standingby conceptualizingthe injury as
the failure to be treated equally.92In Gratz v. Bollinger,93moreover, the Court dispensed
with the need for one of the challengers to take concrete steps manifestinga present
interest in applyingin order to have standingto seek injunctive relief. Standingto
projects abroad, given their pleadings concerningtheir past travels to and their future interest
in travellingagain to viewthe habitats of specific endangered animals in remote parts of the
world. See id. at 582(Stevens, J., concurringin the judgment);id. at 589(Blackmun, J., with
OConnor, J., dissenting). Another two members of the Court apparently would have upheld
the two individual plaintiffs standing had plane tickets been purchased for their trips, mani-
festinga stronger likelihood that plaintiffs would in the future be in the vicinity of the animals
whose protection they sought. See id. at 57980 (Kennedy, J., with Souter, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (While it may seem trivial to require that Mses. Kelly
and Skilbred acquire airline tickets to the project sites or announce a date certain upon which
they will return, this is not a case where it is reasonable to assume that the affiants will be
using the sites on a regular basis . . . . (citations omitted)).
90 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007). The relationship between the present loss of land and the
risk of future harm in the opinion is unclear, as is the precise impact of Massachusettss being
a sovereign state.
91 Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 114546 (2013).
92 Thus, for example, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438U.S. 265, 280
n.14 (1978), the Court accepted as an Article III injury the lost opportunity to be considered
without regard to race, a formulation that avoided problems of causation and redressability that
would have been presented by characterizingthe injury as denial of a place in the medical
school. Cf. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306U.S. 354(1939)(holdingthat discrimination in selection
of grand jury denied equal protection and required reversal of conviction in case where petit
jury that convicted did not exclude jurors based on race).
93 539U.S. 244(2003).
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seek future relief for plaintiff Hamacher was upheld, even though, after beingdenied
admission, he began attendinganother school and had not at the time of filinghis
complaint made an application to transfer. For the Court, it was sufficient that he was
able and ready to apply if the race-based admissions policy, which he alleged would
deny him equal treatment, were changed.94
If standing doctrine is supposed in part to preclude suit by bystanders,95and
if plaintiffs must have standingfor each remedy they seek, some effort towards ap-
plying, demonstratingactual continued interest in attendingthe school, might have
been required. In the absence of such an effort, it is hard to see how his injury (as
a basis for future relief) was either actual or imminent injury, much less certainly
impending.96Gratz upheld standingfor one not even willingto pay the small price
of applying(and whose claimed injury might have been mooted by acceptance). By
contrast, plaintiffs in Clapper were concerned enough about beingsubject to covert
surveillance that they had incurred expenses to try to mitigate the likelihood of in-
jury to the confidentiality of their communications with foreign clients or contacts.97
These steps the Court dismissed as arisingfrom subjective fears that were not suffi-
cient for standing purposes and could not be bootstrapped into injury.98Of course,
inconsistency in the case law does not indicate one way or the other how a particular
issue should be resolved. But inconsistencies do suggest that the denial of standing
in Clapper was very much a choice, at least open under the precedents.
Chains of Connection, Imminence and Traceability:In important ways, the
Courts conclusion that no injury was sufficiently certain or imminent overlapped
94 Id. at 26062.
95 See generally Brilmayer, supra note 17, at 31015 (arguing that an important function
of standingis to protect self-determination by requiringthat only those persons most affected
by a controversial practice can litigate it).
96 Given the relatively low numbers of minority students admitted even under the chal-
lenged program, it seems unlikely that any individual white student would realistically be
deterred from tryingto apply by an increased risk that he would not be admitted.
97 In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438U.S. 59(1978), the lower
court found that some members of the plaintiffs had moved away or made plans to move away
from the area. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commn, 431 F.
Supp. 203, 205, 209(W.D.N.C. 1977). Without explicitly so stating, the lower court may
have treated these actions as evidence of the objectively reasonable apprehensions it also
found to constitute one of several immediate effects of the challenged action. The Supreme
Court in upholding standing focused on [s]everal of the immediate adverse effects . . . found
to harm appellees, but noted it was not determining the sufficiency of other effects, including
the possibility of a nuclear accident and the present apprehension generated by this future
uncertainty. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 7374.
98 Given the nature of the plaintiffs work, there seems little reason to doubt the genuine-
ness and reasonableness of their fears of surveillance. Cf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363 (1982) (upholding Article III standing of plaintiff tester who, in order to test
whether a company was discriminatingbased on race, sought information about rental apart-
ments although the plaintiff had no intent to rent or buy one).
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with its analysis of why plaintiffs failed to meet the second requirement for Article III
standing analysis that the injury complained of be traceable to the challenged gov-
ernment action. First, the Court said, the plaintiffs could not showthat the government
would decide to target the particular contacts plaintiffs identified.99Second, they could
not show that if the government so decides, it would use the authority provided by the
2008amendments, which plaintiffs challenged.100Third, the Court said, even if they
could showthe government would seek to surveil their contacts under this statute, that
did not mean the FISA court would permit it.101 Thus, the Court said, We decline to
abandon our usual reluctance to endorse standingtheories that rest on speculation about
the decisions of independent actors.102Fourth, the Court said, even if the FISA Court
authorized surveillance, it might not pick up information from any of the plaintiffs
foreign contacts.103Fifth, even if it did, it might not pick up any communications from
the plaintiffs.104
Applyingsuch reasoningto challenges to covert surveillance would mean that no
one subject to covert surveillance could bringa challenge unless there was an unautho-
rized leak or unless a government proceedingagainst the person was brought. For if
covert surveillance is proceedingcovertly, the subjects of the surveillance would never
be certain that they were beingmonitored. Even though the chain of events described
by the Court does reveal some uncertainty about both the existence of injury and its
traceability to the challenged statute, the importance of the constitutional issue and
the suitability of these plaintiffs to raise it, suggest that the Court erred in cuttingoff,
at a very preliminary stage, lower court proceedings on the constitutional questions.105
99 Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 114849 (2013).
100 Id. at 114849.
101 Id. at 114850.
102 Id. at 1150.
103 Id. at 1148, 1150.
104 Id.
105 Less than four months after the Supreme Court decided Clapper, newspapers began
reportingunauthorized revelations by Edward Snowden concerningthe scope of NSA sur-
veillance under FISA. See Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA PRISM Program Taps
in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data?guni=Article:in%20body%20link.
Accordingto an unsuccessful petition for certiorari of a Ninth Circuit decision,
[t]he immense breadth of the actual surveillance beingconducted under
the auspices of the FAA statute shows that the Amnesty plaintiffs had
better reason to believe their international communications would be
intercepted than even they understood at the time, and casts doubt on this
Courts judgment that their fears of interception were based on specu-
lative assumptions (and were, implicitly, statistically unlikely to come
to pass).
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 32, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Obama, 134S. Ct. 1497
(2014)(No. 13-802);see also id. at 3335 (arguing that revelations concerning minimization
procedures are inconsistent with the Clapper Courts reliance on the minimization procedures,
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Moreover, some elements of the Courts traceability analysis seem disingenuous,
designed to evade decision on the merits. For example, questioningwhether the govern-
ment would use this authority, which it actively sought from Congress and which is
broader and easier to use than pre-existingauthorities,106seems tendentious. Likewise,
given the pleadings of the plaintiffs concerningthe identity of their foreign contacts,
it is hard to see why some of those foreign contacts, like Khalid Sheikh Mohammeds
familyand friends,107would not be targetedformetadatacollection through thebroadest
and most easy to use authority. Treatingthe FISA court as one whose judgments can-
not be predicted also seems disingenuous:This court was and is set up to approve the
governments applications; historically it has approved over 99% of those applications;
and the appellate process, though rarely used, permits the government to seek review
of a denial of its application.108 The FISA court is thus designed to and has in fact
generally approved government applications. Thus, the Courts analysis in Clapper
seems at points lacking in prudential wisdom especially in light of the unauthorized
revelations that came soon after.109
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals in Clapper, applying a reasonable likeli-
hood standard, seems more realistic and less far-fetched:
On these facts, it is reasonably likely that the plaintiffs com-
munications will be monitored under the FAA [the 2008FISA
and revelations concerningthe DOJ actual practice were acknowledged, four months after the
Supreme Court decision, to be inaccurate in describingthe government practice relatingto pro-
vidingnotifications of use ofFAA-derived material). (Certiorari was denied on March 3, 2014.)
106 Clapper, 133S. Ct. at 1149. As noted above, supra note 105, subsequent disclosures
by unauthorized leakers confirm the existence of apparently massive data collection programs.
See also, e.g., Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, Court Gave NSA Broad Leeway in
Surveillance, Documents Show, WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/national-security/court-gave-nsa-broad-leeway-in-surveillance-documents-show
12014/06/30/32b872ec-fae4-11e3-8176-f2c941cf35f1_story.html (reportingthata2010classi-
fied legal certification by the FISA court, leaked by Snowden, authorized surveillance under
Section 702from a list of 193countries in the world).
107 See Clapper, 133S. Ct. at 1157(notingthat one of the plaintiffs alleged that he repre-
sented Khalid Sheik Mohammed).
108 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 19792014, EPIC.ORG,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2014);see also
History of the Federal Judiciary: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, http:/www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_fisc.html(lastvisited Oct.23,
2014)(notingthat FISA court and a review court, to hear government appeals from denial
of its warrant applications, were established in 1978 but that [b]ecause of the almost perfect
record of the Department of Justice in obtainingthe surveillance warrants and other powers it
requested from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the reviewcourt had no occasion
to meet until 2002); Amnesty Intl USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 140 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting
that in 2008, 2,082surveillance orders were sought and 2,081were granted by the FISA court).
109 See supra note 105;infra note 132.
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Amendments Act]. The instant plaintiffs fears of surveillance are
by no means based on mere conjecture, delusional fantasy, or
unfounded speculation. Their fears are fairly traceable to the FAA
because they are based on a reasonable interpretation of the chal-
lenged statute and a realistic understandingof the world. Confer-
ringstandingon these plaintiffs is not tantamount to conferring
standing on any or all citizens who no more than assert that cer-
tain practices of law enforcement offices are unconstitutional.
Lyons, 461U.S. at 111. Most law-abidingcitizens have no oc-
casion to communicate with suspected terrorists;relatively few
Americans have occasion to engage in international communica-
tions relevant to foreign intelligence. These plaintiffs however,
have successfully demonstrated that their legitimate professions
make it quite likely that their communications will be intercepted
if the government as seems inevitable exercises the authority
granted by the FAA.110
The Court of Appeals also found that the plaintiffs were actingobjectively reasonably
in takingmeasures to protect the confidentiality of their communications, in light
of the realistic risks of future injury from surveillance under the statute;they thus
suffered present injury based on a realistic threat of future harm.111But the Supreme
Court treated the expenditures and measures beingtaken by the plaintiffs to avoid
surveillance as based on their merely subjective reactions, insufficient to establish
standing,112given the lack of certainty about the fact or likelihood that they were ac-
tually beingsurveilled.
As Justice Breyers dissent argued,113the Court treats these measures differently
than it treated the preventive testingmeasures that conventional alfalfa growers claimed
they would need to use to find out if their crops were affected by genetically modified
110 Clapper, 638F.3d at 139(some citations omitted).
111 Id. at 134, 141, 14344. That surveillance is reasonably likely might still be viewed by
some members of the Court as insufficient for standing, but acceptingthe reasonable like-
lihood of surveillance would have made for a less disingenuous analysis. Cf. Clapper, 133
S. Ct. at 1150 n.5 (stating that, if there were a difference between certainly impending and
substantial risk, respondents fall short of even that [latter] standard.).
The Court of Appeals also indicated that the Fourth Amendment standard ofwhen it would
be reasonable to do so did not vary as between attorneys protectingconfidential communi-
cations and others, e.g., journalists. Clapper, 638F.3d at 144n.27. A difference may be that
when it becomes objectively reasonable to take such measures, attorneys unlike those who
do not have privileged and confidentiality obligations to clients may have an obligation to
do so. Cf. Declaration of Professor Stephen Gillers, Amnesty Intl USA v. McConnell, 646
F. Supp. 2d 633(S.D.N.Y. 2009)(No. 08Civ. 6259), 2008WL 5267726(explainingthe duty
of confidentiality imposed by lawyers).
112 Clapper, 133S. Ct. at 1151(quotingdissentingopinion in lower court).
113 Id. at 116364 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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alfalfa seeds in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms.114In both cases, Breyer argued,
the challengers should be seen as incurringpresent expenses that were a reasonable
response to the objective likelihood of future harm. Moreover, in Friends of the Earth
v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,115the Court treated as reasonable pre-
cautions taken by the plaintiffs to avoid usingoutdoor facilities which had a risk of con-
tamination byunlawful pollutingdischarges.116It is difficult, within the framework only
of standing doctrine, to account for the Courts acceptance of the reasonableness of
precautionary measures taken in Monsanto, and in Laidlaw, but not in Clapper.
As the Court itself recognized, Clappers certainly impending standard was
arguably in tension with a line of cases upholding standing based on a substantial
risk that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs
to mitigate or avoid that harm.117 However, the Court said, the plaintiffs did not
meet the substantial risk standard by pleadingconcrete facts, and the Court seemed
to suggest that to the extent the risk of harm depends on third party decisions,
plaintiffs cannot rely on speculation about the unfettered choices made by inde-
pendent actors not before the court.118Yet in a number of the cited cases, the risks
deemed sufficient to give rise to Article III standingincluded risks posed by third
party actions in Monsanto,119of genetically modified seed growers, in Pennell v.
City of San Jose,120of tenants seekingand receivinghardship relief to the detriment
114 561U.S. 139(2010).
115 528U.S. 167(2000).
116 Id. at 18283.
117 Clapper, 133S. Ct. at 1150n.5(citingMonsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561U.S.
139, 15255 (2010) and citing as see also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988);
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 100001 (1982); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Natl
Union, 442U.S. 289, 298(1979)). Monsanto and Pennell are discussed in the text above. In
Blum, the Court applied the substantial risk standard to uphold nursing home residents
standingto challenge procedures for transfer to lower levels of care, but not to challenge proce-
dures for transfers for higher levels of care, where there was no evidence that the complainants
had been transferred or been threatened with transfer to higher levels of care. See also Babbitt,
442 U.S. at 298 (stating that [a] plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic
danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statutes operation or enforcement
(emphasis added)). See supra note 84, further discussingBabbitt.
118 Clapper, 133S. Ct. at 1150n.5(internal quotation marks omitted)(citation omitted).
119 561U.S. 139(2010)(upholdingstandingfor conventional growers of alfalfa to sue the
EPA to enjoin its decision deregulatingthe growingof genetically modified alfalfa seeds). Even
though it was uncertain whether use of those seeds by the other farmers would affect the
challengers crops, the Court said, the threat that they might do so and consequent need for the
traditional growers to do testingof their own crops to find out were sufficient for standing.
Id. at 15355. In Clapper, the Court might have followed this reasoningto find that even if
plaintiffs were not subject to surveillance the threat that they might be made it reasonable for
them to take precautions (especially if they were in a lawyer-client relationship)and thus
afforded standingto test the legality of the program.
120 485U.S. 1(1988)(holdingthat the risk that a rent control statute permitting hardship
exceptions for particular tenants would be enforced against members of an association was
sufficient to uphold standing, even though there was no specific pleadingthat any association
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of landlords. Moreover, arguably comparable relationships of present fears to fu-
ture injury in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.121and
Laidlaw,122were found sufficient to uphold standing.
members had such tenants and the representation at oral argument that association members
had such tenants did not say anythingabout whether those tenants would seek an exception
or whether the exception would be granted). Thus, the risk of actual injury to members of the
buildingassociation, by virtue of the statute, depended on the anticipated action of independent
third parties, as Justice Breyers Clapper dissent points out. See Clapper, 133S. Ct. at 1161
(Breyer, J., dissenting)(notingPennells standard that the landlords demonstrate a realistic
danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statutes operation, and Pennells
conclusion that the landlords had done so by showing a likelihood of enforcement and a
probability, that the ordinance would make the landlords charge lower rents even though
the landlords had not shown (1)that they intended to raise the relevant rents to the point of
causingunreasonably severe hardship;(2)that the tenants would challenge those increases;
or (3) that the citys hearing examiners and arbitrators would find against the landlords. Here,
even more so than in Pennell, there is a realistic danger that the relevant harm will occur.
(citations omitted)). In Clapper, that injury to the plaintiffs depended on the third party deci-
sions of the government and the FISA court likewise need not have negated the plaintiffs
standing, where the unique history and nature of the statutory scheme was such that it could
reasonably be expected that the government would seek and be permitted to conduct surveil-
lance of the plaintiffs contacts and where the legitimately covert nature of the governments
acts would ordinarily preclude more definitive claims of injury.
121 438U.S. 59, 74(1978)(indicatingthat exposure to radiation in the environment was
a direct and present injury, given our generalized concern about exposure to radiation and the
apprehension flowingfrom the uncertainty about the health . . . consequences of even small
emissions). Cf. id. at 77(deemingit sufficient for satisfyingthe redressability component
of standing that there was a substantial likelihood that the plants would not go forward as
planned if the Price-Anderson Act were invalidated).
122 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (upholding individuals standing to challenge the environmental
practices of the defendant, even though the lower courts had found (and the Supreme Court
did not disagree) that the companys activities caused no harm to the environment). Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, explained that [t]he relevant showing for purposes of
Article III standing . . . is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 181.
And such injury to the plaintiffs was adequately pleaded by allegations that plaintiffs had
engaged in recreational and aesthetic activities in the area but no longer engaged in these
activities in or near the river because she was concerned about harmful effects from discharged
pollutant; another plaintiff, Moore[,] testified at length that she would hike, picnic, camp,
swim, boat, and drive near or in the river were it not for her concerns about illegal discharges.
Id. at 182. The Court distinguished Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504U.S. 555(1992):in
Laidlaw, the challenged activities directly affected the plaintiffs interests, and the affiants
conditional statements that they would use the nearby North Tyger River for recreation if
Laidlaw were not discharging pollutants into it [could not] be equated with the speculative
some day intentions to visit endangered species halfway around the world that we held
insufficient to show injury in fact in Lujan. 528 U.S. at 184. The plaintiffs fears of harm
were found reasonable, and sufficient to meet the Article III injury requirement. In Clapper,
as well, plaintiffs fears of privacy invasion seemed reasonable at the time, in light of the scope
and purpose of the government surveillance program, even before the unauthorized disclosures
that came later.
158 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:127
The Clapper Court noted that the challenged statute did not target the plaintiffs
as U.S. based persons, and indeed, took affirmative steps to prohibit targetingthem,
and suggested that prior cases, such as Pennell, were in this respect different.123This
arguable distinction, however, does not seem sufficient to justify, and surely does not
compel, the difference in result, given the obviously stronglikelihood that surveillance
of foreign persons with contacts in the United States would lead to surveillance of
U.S. persons. This is so especially because the statute challenged in Clapper on its
face contemplates that communications of U.S. persons will be intercepted, and re-
quires reportingon such intercepts to, inter alia, congressional committees.124By these
provisions the legislation itself recognizes both the likelihood that U.S. persons com-
munications would be captured and the seriousness of such acts.125
Injury to Plaintiffs and to Society:In decidingnot to allow adjudication of the
merits of a substantial challenge to the constitutionality of the 2008amendment, the
Court not only dealt incorrectly with the plaintiffs but also may have contributed to,
or passed up an opportunity to help avert, harm to society. An important function
of the courts is to provide a site for the vindication of constitutional rights. Another
important function of the Court is to provide, through public adjudication, a degree
of accountability under law for other government actors. In Clapper, the Court failed
to provide guidance on novel legal questions affectingthe rights of many, in reasoning
suggestingthat the courts would generally not be available to do so. In so doing, it is
possible that the decision contributed to incentives for unlawful leaks and to declining
confidence, in both the American public and needed allies, in U.S. capacity for man-
agingnecessary covert activities, data collection, and retention, in ways that conform
with the rule of law.126
In Laidlaw it was evident that the defendants activities were unlawful, even though they
were found not to harm the environment. Clapper thus differs from both Laidlaw and Lyons
in that neither the fact of surveillance nor its illegality were conceded or established. In both
Lyons and Laidlaw there was clear evidence of past wrongful conduct. But the legitimate
need for secrecy in covert surveillance should not be a reason to apply heightened standards
of showinginjury, causation, and redressability;if anything, the necessary secrecy of covert
operations should allow plaintiffs with reason to believe they are subject to surveillance to
establish standingon lesser threshold showings. See supra notes 6272 and accompanying text.
123 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 114750.
124 See 50U.S.C. §1881a(k)(l)(3)(A)(2006& Supp. II 2009).
125 Cf. R. v. Tse, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531, ¶¶ 8284, 9899 (Can.) (holding unconstitutional,
as a breach of the Canadian Charters protection against unreasonable searches, a statutory
authorization for covert surveillanceof specified individuals that did not require after-the-fact
disclosure to the individuals of the surveillance or comparably adequate accountability). The
Canadian Supreme Court also commented that a reportingrequirement to the Parliament
that does not provide for active oversight of wiretapping generally, far less any particular
use of the wiretap provisions, cannot be a constitutional requirement of a reasonable wiretap
power within the meaning of the Charters protections against unreasonable searches. Id.
at ¶90. Query whether the Court thereby implies that such a reportingrequirement would
not by itself mitigate the need to inform the individuals directly affected by the surveillance?
126 See, e.g., supra note 72.
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There is, to be sure, substantial and continued disagreement about the constitu-
tionality of the various forms of mass surveillance now authorized.127 If the Court
had allowed the merits in Clapper to be litigated, it is possible that the challenged sur-
veillance program would have been upheld as constitutional. It is also possible that
such a decision, legitimatingthe statute, would make it more difficult to secure statu-
tory protection against unnecessarily broad forms of surveillance or data retention.128
Moreover, even if the courts had found constitutional violations, the scope of the
remedy and its effects on privacy interests would be uncertain;effects on would-be
leakers are even more uncertain, as motivations there are no doubt complex.
On the other hand, the claim that decisions upholdinggovernment practices nec-
essarily result in uncritical legitimation effects foreclosingfurther political attention
is open to doubt. Congress has at times responded to judicial decisions upholding
government practices against constitutional challenge with legislation designed to pro-
vide protection to individual rights.129And, even when the Court upholds government
127 For example, it might have been argued at the time of Clapper, based on Smith v.
Maryland, 442U.S. 735(1979)(holdingthat a bank customer has no expectation of privacy,
and thus no Fourth Amendment rights protectingagainst government seizure of data, in
information voluntarily disclosed to the customers bank), that metadata collection programs
from third party carriers violate no Fourth Amendment rights. See also PRIVACY & CIV.
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED
UNDER SECTION 215OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 11 (Jan 23, 2014) (condemning the NSAs metadata
program as unauthorized by statute but stating that existing doctrine does not fully answer
whether the [program] is constitutionally sound). But cf. Riley v. California, 134S. Ct. 2473
(2014)(treatinginformation on a cell phone as sufficiently private as to generally require a
search warrant before a cell phone seized incident to a lawful arrest can itself be searched).
Moreover, the program challenged in Clapper authorized surveillance targeted at persons out-
side the United States, though it contemplated that conversations with U.S. persons would be
overheard;the Fourth Amendment may allowmore latitude to the government in connection
with foreign intelligence surveillance than domestic, see United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for
the E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 30809 (1972), though how those categories
should be applied in the present technological circumstances is uncertain. For disagreement
in the lower courts on the constitutionality of a different program the collection of tele-
phonic metadata for virtually all phone calls in the United States compare Klayman v. Obama,
957F. Supp. 2d 1(D.D.C. 2013), with Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959F. Supp.
2d 724(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
128 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Living with a Bill of Rights, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN
RIGHTS 319 (Conor Gearty & Adam Tomkins eds., 1996) (describing legitimation effects
of judicial decisions rejectingconstitutional challenges to legislation or government action).
But see Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation, 94MICH. L. REV.
245, 269n.99(1995)(questioninghow often a decision upholdinga statute has prevented
development of better laws).
129 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494U.S. 872(1990)(holdingthat the First
Amendment did not require states to make accommodation for religiously motivated behavior
in violation of generally applicable laws), responded to by statute in Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107Stat. 1488;Geduldigv. Aiello, 417U.S.
484(1974)(holdingthat discrimination based on pregnancy was not discrimination based
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action, it may provide guidance and foundations for future limitations on the govern-
ment power beingexercised;130it may explicitly construe statutes to avoid constitu-
tional doubts.131 Thus one can at least wonder whether, had the Court allowed the
litigation to proceed in the lower courts, data collection and retention programs might
have been improved sooner, with trust in government enhanced, and incentives to leak
information diminished.132Both national securityand rule-of-lawprotection of privacy
rights might have benefitted.
***
In Windsor we see a Court eager itself to resolve an important issue of constitu-
tional equality, notwithstandingthe absence of any real disagreement between the
on sex), responded to by statute in Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555,
92Stat. 2076. Cf. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporters Privilege,
91MINN. L. REV. 515, 53236 (2007) (noting that while courts were rejectingconstitutional
or common law claims of journalist or reporter privileges, state legislatures led the way with
adoption of statutory shield laws).
130 Thus, for example, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408U.S. 665(1972), the Court rejected a
claim by a journalist that he had a constitutional privilege grounded in the First Amendment
not to provide grand jury testimony. But the Court did not simply reject any claim of privilege
or special First Amendment concerns; it suggested that the relevant standard is that the govern-
ment convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject
of overriding and compelling state interest. Id. at 70001 (citation omitted). Justice Lewis
Powells concurrence emphasized that no harassment of journalists would be tolerated, and
that journalists subpoenaed to testify had constitutional rights with respect to the gathering
of news. Id. at 70910 (Powell, J., concurring). Opinions in Branzburg have beencited in lower
courts in support of journalists claims for special protection under the First Amendment. See
Zerilli v. Smith, 656F.2d 705, 711& nn.39, 41(D.C. Cir. 1981);Bruno & Stillman Inc. v.
Globe Newspapers, 633 F.2d 583, 59496 (1st Cir. 1980).
131 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 68999 (2001); United States v. Thirty-Seven
(37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 36873 (1971).
132 Edward Snowdens disclosures of NSA metadata and mass data collection activities
were first reported June 5, 2013, less than four months after Clapper came down. See Glenn
Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE
GUARDIAN (June5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records
-verizon-court-order. The possible impact of the Clapper decision on Snowdens disclosures
is suggested by the report that one of Snowdens first questions to his attorney, Ben Wizner,
in July of 2013, was, Do you have standing now? Colleen Walsh, Defending Snowden,
HARVARDGAZETTE(Mar. 26, 2014), http:/news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2014/03/defending
-snowden. In both Klayman v. Obama and ACLU v. Clapper, the district courts noted the role
of Snowdens unauthorized disclosures of information in providing a factual basis for plaintiffs
assertion of standingin those cases. On the distinct point of possible harm to the United States
from unauthorized disclosures, see, e.g., David Ignatius, Underestimating the Enemys Will
to Fight, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2014, at A19(describingNSA head Clapper as suggesting
that due to leaks, NSA had to throttle back on some intelligence collection because we need
to recover foreign intelligence partnerships and commercial partnership. We are accepting
more risk in this country because of that, Clapper warned.).
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government and the party plaintiff and the availability of individual judicial remedies
for other affected parties, numberingin the hundreds of thousands. In Clapper, we see
a Court refusingto resolve an important issue of constitutional privacy that may affect
even more U.S. persons but whose scope is unknown, knowledge beingheld (at the
time of the judgment)largely within the secret confines of the Executive Branch.
Perhaps the Court evaluates differently the harms from discriminatory treatment of
same-sexcouples and the harms to privacy interests that could be posed by surveil-
lance programs (most of whose U.S. victims were unaware of the monitoring). The
malleability of supposed Article III requirements for standing, in light of the Courts
evaluation of the substantive claims, is old news;scholars have frequently described,
and decried, inconsistencies in the Courts standing case law. Viewing that case law
as a method for exercisingsound judicial discretion about the balance between judicial
reviewto vindicate individual rights and allowingroom for democraticdecisionmaking
about importantmatters, some degree of inconsistencyshould not be surprising. But the
harms, not only to the plaintiffs but also to the larger society from the Courts refusal
to exercise jurisdiction in Clapper, may turn out to be considerable.133
II. CITY OF LOS ANGELES V. LYONS:A PREDECESSOR CASE
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,134 though not discussed by the Supreme Court in
Clapper, figured prominently in the Second Circuits decision in Clapper. For the
Court of Appeals, Lyons was the seminal case concerningstandingto seek relief as
against future injury. In Lyons, the Court for the first time held that a plaintiff, clearly
injured by past assertedly unlawful conduct for which he had standingto seek dam-
ages, lacked standingto seek an injunction because of uncertainty over whether the
plaintiff himself would in the future be subject to the unlawful conduct again.
In the Court of Appeals decision (later reversed in Clapper), Judge Lynch distin-
guished Lyons, which found that a motorist who had been subjected to an injurious
chokehold by the L.A. County Police Department lacked standing to sue for in-
junctive relief since he could not show a likelihood that he would again be subject to
such action in the future.135For Judge Lynch, the difference between the two cases lay
in part on the fact that the conduct complained of in Clapper was explicitly autho-
rized by a new statute, which the government had eagerly sought:
It is significant that the injury that the plaintiffs fear results from
conduct that is authorized by statute. This case is not like Lyons,
133 FISA court reviewprovides at least some check on government action. But such review
is nonadversarial, and nonpublic. Even the decisions of the FISA court were, for the most
part, not published until after recent leaked disclosures. One of the most important functions
of a court is to provide accountability through transparency of public reasoning. The in camera,
nonadversarial proceedings of the FISAcourt does not serve that purpose. Proposals to improve
FISA procedures are under consideration in Congress at this writing.
134 461U.S. 95(1983).
135 Amnesty Intl USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 138 (2d Cir. 2011).
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where the plaintiff feared injury from officers who would have
been actingoutside the law, makingthe injury less likely to occur.
Here, the fact that the government has authorized the potentially
harmful conduct means that the plaintiffs can reasonably assume
that government officials will actually engage in that conduct by
carryingout the authorized surveillance. It is fanciful, moreover,
to question whether the government will ever undertake broad-
based surveillance of the type authorized by the statute. The FAA
was passed specifically to permit surveillance that was not per-
mitted by FISA but that was believed necessary to protect the
national security.136
The Supreme Courts failure to discuss Lyons, or the Second Circuits distinction
of Lyons, might itself be subject to critique as manifestinga lack of regard for the
work of lower federal courts or its own past decisions. But Lyons was, I would argue,
another triple error case, and in ways connected to Clapper.
In Lyons, there was no question that the African American motorist, injured in
application of a chokehold by the police duringa routine traffic stop, had standingto
sue the officers for damages, given his injuries. Under established standards Lyons
had standingto sue the City and its police officers for what he claimed were acts that
violated the Constitution and injured his rights and his body; his case was thus
within Article III. The Court, however, for the first time disaggregated the various
claims for relief from the Article III case, insisting that standing had to be sepa-
rately established for each form of relief sought in the case.
Lyonss complaint had already been found to have merit in the lower courts. As
the Supreme Court explained, the complaint had alleged that
pursuant to the authorization, instruction and encouragement of
Defendant City of Los Angeles, [police officers]regularly and rou-
tinely apply these choke holds in innumerable situations where
they are not threatened by the use of any deadly force whatsoever,
that numerous persons have been injured as the result of the appli-
cation of the chokeholds, that Lyons and others similarly situated
are threatened with irreparable injury in the form of bodily injury
and loss of life, and that Lyons justifiably fears that any contact
he has with Los Angeles Police officers may result in his being
136 Id. While it is true that there was no statutory authority specifically authorizinguse of
the chokeholds in Lyons, and that plaintiffs claim was that the chokeholds were unlawful
under the Constitution, the District Court had found that the use of the chokehold was at the
time authorized by Department policy, see Lyons, 461U.S. at 99, although there was dis-
agreement within the Court on the scope and nature of that policy, compare id. at 106& n.7
with id. at 11722 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In the other respects identified by the Court of
Appeals the cases appear plainly to be distinguishable.
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choked and strangled to death without provocation, justification
or other legal excuse.137
The District Court in the case had found that Lyons had been stopped for a traffic
infringement and that without provocation or legal justification the officers involved
had applied a Department-authorized chokehold which resulted in injuries to the
plaintiff.138Moreover, the District Court had found that such chokeholds were autho-
rized by the department in situations where no one is threatened by death or grievous
bodily harm, and further that officers are insufficiently trained, that the use of the
holds involves a high risk of injury or death as then employed, and that their continued
use in situations where neither death nor serious bodily injury is threatened is uncon-
scionable in a civilized society.139
Not surprisingly, in light of these findings, the District Court concluded that
such use violated Lyons substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.140 The District Court entered a preliminary injunction, enjoining the use of
both the carotid-artery and bar arm holds under circumstances which do not threaten
death or serious bodily injury.141 Additionally, the District Court ordered [a]n im-
proved training program and regular reporting and record keeping.142The District
Courts findings and orders were affirmed on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, in a unan-
imous per curiam opinion.143The Supreme Court, however, by a five to four vote, con-
cluded that the complaints allegations were too speculative to give rise to a reasonable
present belief that Lyons was at risk of beingstopped and assaulted again by the police
(and noted that one could not assume that every police stop would result in unconsti-
tutional infliction of injury),144and thus there was no standingto seek injunctive relief.
As the Court noted, during the pendency of Lyonss case, first filed in 1977, the
number of deaths attributable to the LAPDs use of the chokehold had mounted.145
137 Lyons, 461U.S. at 98.
138 Id. at 99(quotingthe district court).
139 Id. (quotingthe district court).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 100(quotingthe district court).
142 Id. at 99100.
143 656F.2d 417(9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam).
144 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8 (Lyons alleged that he feared he would be choked in any
future encounter with the police. The reasonableness of Lyons fear is dependent upon the like-
lihood of a recurrence of the allegedly unlawful conduct. It is the reality of the threat of repeated
injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiffs subjective apprehensions.
The emotional consequences of a prior act simply are not a sufficient basis for an injunction
absent a real and immediate threat of future injury by the defendant. Of course, emotional upset
is a relevant consideration in a damages action.); id. at 108 ([I]t is no more than conjecture
to suggest that in every . . . encounter between citizens and police, unconstitutional violence
will be used). The Court does not further explain why emotional upset is relevant to
standingin a damages action but not in one for injunctive relief. See infra note 162.
145 Lyons, 461U.S. at 100(notingthat the first complaint alleged two deaths, the amended
complaint alleged ten and by May 1982there had been five more).
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After certiorari was granted, the LAPD imposed a sixmonth moratorium on the use
of chokeholds except when deadly forced is authorized;the City informed the Court
of a question of possible mootness but argued that the case was not moot, and the
plaintiff moved to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.146At briefingand oral
argument, Lyons argued that the case was now moot and urged that the preliminary
injunction be vacated;the City opposed because the moratorium was not permanent
and could be lifted at any time.147 The Court agreed with the City that the case is not
moot, since the moratorium by its terms is not permanent and subsequent events had
not irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.148
Notwithstanding this recognition that the effects of the chokehold practice were
not eradicated, the Court found that Lyons lacked standingbecause, in its view, Lyons
had made an insufficient showingthat he would be subject to an unlawful chokehold
in the future, suggestingthat he was no more at risk in the future of beingsubjected
to an unlawful chokehold than any other person in Los Angeles.149He therefore lacked
146 Id. at 10001. One way of understanding Lyons is that the Court, by disaggregatingthe
standinginquiry to particular forms of relief, also shifted analysis of the risk of future harm
from mootness doctrine to standingdoctrine. See generally Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies,
and Public Law Litigation, supra note 39. Mootness doctrine would not necessarily have
required abandonment or vacatur of injunctive relief, were any granted. Id. at 2627 (arguing
that mootness is a much more flexible tool than standing). Lyonss standing was measured
as of the time he filed his complaint, well before the LAPD sought itself to restrain use of the
chokehold. Typically, defendants who are subject to prospective judicial relief raise mootness
claims;and typically, the burden is on the party claimingmootness to establish that there was
no need for relief. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345U.S. 629, 633(1953);13CHARLES
ALANWRIGHTET AL., FEDERALPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.5 (3d ed. 2008) (Mootness
can be found only if the defendant can bear the heavy burden of showing that there is no
reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.). Even the repeal of a challenged
ordinance is not necessarily sufficient to moot the claim for injunctive relief, where there is
a prospect that the law would be reenacted if the injunction were withdrawn. See, e.g., City
of Mesquite v. Aladdins Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 28889 (1982); WRIGHT ET AL., supra,
at §3533.5. By treatingthe likelihood of future injury arisingfrom repetition of past events
as a question of the plaintiffs standing ab initio to seek injunctive relief, rather than as a
question of mootness, Lyons also switched the burdens that typically fall on defendants and
plaintiffs. Cf. Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation, supra note 39,
at 2627 (noting that under the Courts prior case law, the personal interest needed to defeat
mootness may be different from, and less than, that required initially to establish . . . standing).
147 Lyonss argument was presumably motivated by a desire to avoid an adverse decision
by the Supreme Court on the merits a reasonable concern given that the four lower court
judges had agreed on the violation and the remedy, the Court of Appeals decision was per
curiam without dissent, but certiorari had nonetheless been granted. Notwithstanding Lyonss
argument formootness, the decisionagainst mootness seemscorrect under prevailingstandards.
Moreover, whatever position Lyons as a litigant took on mootness, had the Court not reached
the conclusion on standing that it did, other plaintiffs might have been able to seek injunctive
relief in the lower courts.
148 Lyons, 461U.S. at 101(quotingCnty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440U.S. 625(1979)).
149 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111 (Absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in
a similar way, Lyons is no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles;
2014] STANDING AND THE ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS 165
standingto pursue that form of relief, as the Court saw it, even though he had plainly
suffered an Article III injury for which he could seek damages. In bifurcatingthe in-
jury from the remedy as the Court did, it acted in an unprecedented manner, going
beyond the holdings of the principal cases on which it relied.150
and a federal court may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that
certain practices of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional.). Although this passage
appears in a part of the opinion devoted to equitable arguments against injunctive relief, the
Court cites three Article III standingcases immediately after these sentences, id., emphasizing
the analytical overlap in its arguments.
150 The Courts claim that Lyons was no extension of prior cases was, as the dissent stated,
somewhat disingenuous. Id. at 12324 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Rizzo v. Goode, 423U.S.
362(1976)and OShea v. Littleton, 414U.S. 488(1974)were the principal past decisions on
which the Court relied. In neither case was a party complainingof and seekingboth damages
and injunctive relief to protect himself or herself from a specific, injurious, and unlawful
action that had previously been directed against him or her, as in Lyons. In OShea, the Court
noted that the nineteen named plaintiffs had identified no specific instance of past discrimi-
natory conduct towards them by the judges who were the petitioners. Id. at 492. The Court did
note that counsel asserted, at oral argument, that some of the plaintiffs had in fact suffered from
the alleged unconstitutional practices, and commented that past exposure to illegal conduct
does not in itself show a present case or controversy regardinginjunctive relief, however, if
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects; but the Court also noted other
significant barriers to relief had cases involvingthe respondents been pendingbefore the peti-
tioner judges. Id. at 49596. In the Supreme Court, the only petitioners were judges against
whom no damages were sought (though the complaint had also alleged police misconduct).
Id. at 490, 492. For standingpurposes, the fact that the only petitioners were judges made the
possibility of future harm far more remote than in Lyons, since the challengers would have
had to be arrested and charged for future misconduct before appearingbefore the judges of
whose conduct they complained.
In Rizzo, the plaintiffs asserted that they and others were the victims of various forms of
constitutional rights violations by the police;the injunctive relief they sought, however, was
directed at the improvement of police disciplinary mechanisms. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 36466;
COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357F. Supp. 1289(E.D. Pa. 1973). The Court noted the failure to sue
the individual police officers and argued that the causal nexus between the named defendants
failure to develop better police disciplinary practices and the harms suffered was too remote
and tenuous. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371 (Individual police officers not named as parties to
the action were found to have violated the constitutional rights of particular individuals, only
a few of whom were parties plaintiff. As the facts developed, there was no affirmative link
between the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any
plan or policy by petitioners express or otherwise showing their authorization or approval
of such misconduct. Instead, the sole causal connection found by the District Court between
petitioners and the individual respondents was that in the absence of a change in police disci-
plinary procedures, the incidents were likely to continue to occur, not with respect to them,
but as to the members of the classes they represented. In sum, the genesis of this lawsuit a
heated dispute between individual citizens and certain policemen has evolved into an attempt
by the federal judiciary to resolve a controversy between the entire citizenry of Philadelphia and
the petitioningelected and appointed officials over what steps might, in the Court of Appeals 
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The Courts novel decision on standing in Lyons was vigorously condemned by much
of the scholarly literature. Indeed, a Harvard Law Review Note emphasizingthat Lyons
had already suffered a concrete injury givingrise to a serious claim for damages, stated
that the assertion that the decision
fell squarely within OShea [v. Littleton]and Rizzo [v. Goode]
was . . . simply disingenuous. . . . [Unlike] the plaintiffs in Rizzo
and OShea, who had sought only equitable relief, Lyons had a
live claim for damages, which under prior decisions would have
created the personal stake in the outcome of the controversy re-
quired by Article III.151
Likewise, Justice Thurgood Marshalls dissent noted that [b]ecause the plaintiffs
in OShea, Rizzo, Mattis, and Zwickler did not seek to redress past injury, their stand-
ingto sue depended entirely on the risk of future injury they faced. Apart from the
words, [appear] to have the potential for prevention of future police misconduct.). The Court
expressed doubt about whether there was an Article III case or controversy, because
the individual respondents claim to real and immediate injury rests not
upon what the named petitioners might do to them in the future such as
set a bond on the basis of race but upon what one of a small, unnamed
minority of policemen might do to them in the future because of that un-
known policemans perception of departmental disciplinary procedures.
Id. at 372. Unlike in Lyons, there was no departmental policy authorizingthe conduct com-
plained of. Rizzo, 423U.S. at 368. The Supreme Court rested judgment on its analysis of both
equitable considerations and federalism, findingthat the order revisingcitizen complaint and
disciplinary procedures could not be supported by the findingof sixteen violations of consti-
tutional rights by a large metropolitan police force over the course of one year, a pattern the
Court found fairly normal for large city police forces. Id. at 37475.
No one has suggested that use of the chokehold as a routine measure, or the death rate fol-
lowingsuch use in Los Angeles at the time of Lyons, was normal. Even the dissent in Rizzo
noted that the incidents of unconstitutional conduct that had occurred were not pursuant to any
policy, id. at 383(Blackmun, J., dissenting), in contrast to the facts found in Lyons, see supra
note 137, that the Department authorized use of the chokehold. Rizzo may have turned much
more on the majoritys disinclination to impose any form of liability on public officials for
failures to train or impose discipline. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 38485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489U.S. 378, 388(1989)(concludingthat failure to train
can be basis for liability only where it manifests a deliberate indifference to rights);Monell
v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 69195 (1978) (rejecting respondeat superior theories
of liability under Section 1983actions);cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 67677 (2009)
(rejectingsupervisory liability for unconstitutional discrimination in Bivens actions).
151 The Supreme Court, 1982 TermFederal Jurisdiction and Procedure Standing to
Seek Equitable Relief, 97HARV. L. REV. 215, 219(1983)[hereinafter Standing to Seek
Equitable Relief];Lyons, 461 U.S. at 12126 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For additional cri-
tique, see Winter, supra note 2, at 37475; Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public
Law Litigation, supra note 39.
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desire to eliminate the possibility of future injury, the plaintiffs in those cases had
no other personal stake in the outcome of the controversies.152Moreover, and also
unlike the challenges in OShea and Rizzo, which embraced a very wide range of
police and judicial practices, the gist of Lyonss complaint was focused on a very
specific police practice.153
In Lyons, then, as in Clapper, the Court had discretion, under prior decisions, in
how to resolve the case and chose to narrow the arena of justiciability both cases
were unforced errors. Motivated by an apparent concern to prevent undue interfer-
ence in the operations of police work, the Court in Lyons erred in denyingstanding,
in several respects.
First, the fact that the plaintiff had once been injured by the very government
policy of which he complained gave him precisely the kind of special stake, differ-
entiated from the general public, with which Article III standingis concerned. The
decision left Lyons, and those situated like him, without an effective remedy to pro-
vide for their future security, reducingthe right not to be unlawfully assaulted by the
police essentially to a right to seek damages for being assaulted rather than the right
to be secure in their persons protected by the Fourth Amendment (or the right to
equal treatment owed to citizens of the United States and all persons therein).154
Who better than a person who himself has been subject to such unlawful conduct
to seek to enjoin its future use?The introduction of a requirement that such a plaintiff
allege that he himself is likely again to be subjected to the force he was already sub-
jected to was a significant heighteningof the requirements for pleadingstanding, as
the dissent bitterly protested.155 The Courts articulated requirement that, to establish
152 Lyons, 461U.S. at 124(Marshall, J., dissenting).
153 Standing to Seek Equitable Relief, supra note 151, at 219;Fallon, Of Justiciability,
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation, supra note 39, at 44.
154 Damages claims, unlike claims for injunctive relief, may be defeated in actions against
individual officers by qualified immunity, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457U.S. 800(1982),
and against local governments by the need to prove a policy. See Monell v. Dept Soc. Servs.,
436U.S. 658(1978). Moreover, damages claims may be subject to settlements, which, if kept
private, do little to clarify the lawcontrollinggovernment action and whose deterrent impact
may be undermined by particular budgetary arrangements for financial liabilities. For a further
explanation of why damage awards have not been effective in controllingpolice misconduct,
see Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 453(2004).
155 See, e.g., Lyons, 461U.S. at 121(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall detailed
the facts behind the high death rates from use of the chokehold:
Although the City instructs its officers that use of a chokehold does not
constitute deadly force, since 1975no less than 16persons have died
followingthe use of a chokehold by an LAPD police officer. Twelve
have been Negro males. The evidence submitted to the District Court
established that for many years it has been the official policy of the city
to permit police officers to employ chokeholds in a variety of situations
where they face no threat of violence. In reported altercations between
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a justiciable claim for injunctive relief, such a plaintiff would need to allege that all
police officers always choke citizens they encounter or that they were authorized to do
so (without provocation),156seems more designed to undermine Fourth Amendment
LAPD officers and citizens the chokeholds are used more frequently than
any other means of physical restraint. Between February 1975and July
1980, LAPD officers applied chokeholdson at least975occasions, which
represented more than three-quarters of the reported altercations.
Id. at 11516 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). These figures, he explained un-
doubtedly understated the dimensions of the problem. Id. at 116n.6(Marshall, J., dissenting).
The barbarity of the procedure was also detailed:
It is undisputed that chokeholds pose a high and unpredictable risk of
serious injury or death. Chokeholds are intended to bringa subject under
control by causingpain and renderinghim unconscious. Dependingon
the position of the officers arm and the force applied, the victims vol-
untary or involuntary reaction, and his state of health, an officer may
inadvertently crush the victims larynx, trachea, or hyoid. The result
may be death caused by either cardiac arrest or asphyxiation. An LAPD
officer described the reaction of a person to being choked as do[ing]
the chicken, in reference apparently to the reactions of a chicken when
its neck is wrung. The victim experiences extreme pain. His face turns
blue as he is deprived of oxygen, he goes into spasmodic convulsions,
his eyes roll back, his body wriggles, his feet kick up and down, and his
arms move about wildly.
Id. at 11618 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(footnoteand citationomitted).Andunder the conditions
that prevailed before the preliminaryinjunction, Marshall noted, moredeathscouldbeexpected:
[T]he officers are taught to maintain the chokehold until the suspect goes
limp, despite substantial evidence that the application of a chokehold in-
variably induces a flight or flee syndrome, producing an involuntary
struggle by the victim which can easily be misinterpreted by the officer
as willful resistance that must be overcome by prolongingthe chokehold
and increasingthe force applied. In addition, officers are instructed that
the chokeholds can be safely deployed for up to three or four minutes.
Robert Jarvis, the citys expert who has taught at the Los Angeles Police
Academy for the past twelve years, admitted that officers are never told
that the bar-arm control can cause death if applied for just two seconds.
Of the nine deaths for which evidence was submitted to the District
Court, the average duration of the choke where specified was approxi-
mately 40seconds.
Id. at 119(Marshall, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
156 Id. at 10506. But see id. at 121 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (There is no basis for the
Courts assertion that Lyons has failed to allege that the City either orders or authorizes appli-
cation of the chokeholds where there is no resistance or other provocations. I am completely
at a loss to understand howparagraphs 8and 13can be deemed insufficient to allege that the
Citys policy authorizes the use of chokeholds without provocation. The Court apparently
finds Lyons complaint wanting because, although it alleges that he was choked without provo-
cation and that the officers acted pursuant to an official policy, it fails to allege in haec verba
that the Citys policy authorizes the choking of suspects without provocation. I am aware of
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rights to security of the person than to limit the federal courts to traditional cases or
controversies. The Court in effect evaded the implications of the District Courts find-
ingthat the use of chokeholds was authorized by the department, and of evidence that
chokeholds had been used by the LAPD at least 975times over a five year period,157
in concludingthat Lyons did not face a reasonable likelihood of again beingsubject
to the harm.
Moreover, the Courts assertion that Lyons had no more reason to fear such
police assaults in the future than any other person seems willfully blind to the facts
of American life. That Lyons had once been the recipient of such abusive conduct in
all probability did make it more likely that he would be subject to similar behavior in
the future than was the case for a random motorist in Los Angeles. A random motorist,
for one thing, was likely to be white and, as Justice Marshalls dissent showed, a dis-
proportionate number of those subjected to chokeholds with resultinginjuries were
black or Hispanic: [I]n a City where Negro males constitute 9% of the population, they
have accounted for 75% of the deaths resulting from the use of chokeholds.158Black
citizens in Los Angeles were twenty times more likely to be strangled in chokeholds
than were whites.159The casual racism that may have contributed to these astonishing
figures is suggested by a widely quoted remark of thenLAPD Chief Darryl Gates
who, when asked why blacks were dying in such disproportionate numbers at the
hands of the police, suggested that the disparitywas attributable to physiological differ-
ences between blacks and normal people.160To say that Lyons had no greater chance
than the general citizenry of again being subjected to this harm ignored his status
as a black male who thereby faces a markedly heightened chance of beingillegally
mistreated by the police.161
A random motorist might also have been better off than Mr. Lyons was and thus
less likely to be driving a car with defective tail lights the purported occasion for the
traffic stop. These factors are objective in the sense of being externally observable.
The Courts refusal to resolve the case on the merits, because Lyons was in no differ-
ent a position than other L.A. citizens, would have created a perception that the law
was profoundly removed from the lived realities of African American drivers in Los
Angeles at the time.
no case decided since the abolition of the old common lawforms of action, and the Court cites
none, that in any way supports this crabbed construction of the complaint. A federal court
is capable of concluding for itself that two plus two equals four.).
157 Id. at 116(Marshall, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 116n.3(Marshall J., dissenting).
159 Standing to Seek Equitable Relief, supra note 151, at 216n.8(citingRespondents Brief
in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95(1983)(No. 81-1064)).
160 Id. (citingNEWSWEEK, May 24, 1982, at 32).
161 Id. at 220;see also Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999UTAH L. REV. 331, 34647;
Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47BUFF. L. REV. 1225
(1999).
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Moreover, it is at least arguable that it is objectively reasonable for one already
subjected to an unlawful procedure producingsubstantial injuries to fear imminent
repetition. That persons not previously subject to enforcement are not allowed to in-
voke their fear of such enforcement as a basis of standingdoes not bear on whether
those who have already been subjected can be understood to have a reasonable fear
of repetition.162 Even grantingthat the likelihood of Lyons again beingsubject to
162 The idea of an objectively reasonable fear might mean one of two things. First, it might
refer to the mathematical odds of a particular event happeningin the future. As already noted,
the Courts claim that Lyons was at no higher risk than average is quite contestable and quite
probably wrongas a matter of externally observable facts. Second, the idea of an objectively
reasonable fear might instead refer to what an average reasonable person would believe;on
this view, even if an average persons feelings are the result of cognitive biases, that would
not necessarily make them unreasonable. An average reasonable person who has already once
been assaulted would be quite likely to have a greater fear of future assault than someone
who had not been (especially if the reasons for the assault were not random but related to a
visible personal characteristic);and, from the internal perspective, this fear could also be
deemed reasonable. Syndromes involvingfear of future injury based on a prior exposure to
a disease agent, while controversial and subject to different requirements, are sometimes treated
as creatingcompensable injury in tort law. See, e.g., Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89
So. 3d 307, 32223 (La. 2012) (Here, each plaintiff testified to a fear of contractingcancer
in the future as a result of his exposure to the toxic chemicals contained in the slop oil for a
period of weeks. . . . While to a scientist in his ivory tower the possibility of cancerous
growth may be so minimal as to be untroubling, we are not prepared to hold that the trier of
fact erred in finding compensable this real possibility to th[ese] worrying workmen. We find
that the lower courts did not err in awarding plaintiffs damages for fear of future injury.
(quotingAnderson v. WeldingTestingLab., Inc., 304So. 2d 351, 353(La. 1974))). For discus-
sions of varyingapproaches to whether and when to allow compensation for fears of future
disease in tort law, see 1LAW OF TOXIC TORTS §7:9(2014)(Michael Dore, compiler);John
C.P. Goldberg& Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88VA. L. REV. 1625, 166071
(2002);Glen Donath, Curing Cancerphobia Phobia: Reasonableness Redefined, 62U. CHI.
L. REV. 1113(1995);Debbie E. Lanin, The Fear of Disease As a Compensable Injury: An
Analysis of Claims Based on AIDS Phobia, 67ST. JOHNS L. REV. 77(1993);cf. Eric J.
Knapp, Note, Tort LawTurning Blood Into Whine: Fear of AIDS as a Cognizable Cause
of Action in New MexicoMadrid v. Lincoln Co. Medical Center, 28N.M.L.REV. 165(1998).
To be sure, in tort law the fear of future injuries is typically linked to a biological process
triggered by plaintiffs prior exposure to a potential disease-causing agent, whereas in police
misconduct cases, it might be thought, actual injury will depend on the interveningacts of
other police officers actingin the future. In both cases, however, there may be only a small
statistical likelihood of the feared future harm occurring and the initial exposure to a harmful
agent or to an incident of police brutality may contribute to future harm only through a com-
bination of other interveningfactors;but as to the injury, tort law suggests that fear of future
harm from past events may sometimes be compensable even if the future harm is remote and
unlikely. (Social psychology suggests that unwarranted violence by one member of a commu-
nity might contribute to similar acts by others, as people tend to view a behavior as correct in
a given situation to the degree that we see others performing it. ROBERT CIALDINI, INFLUENCE:
SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 100(4th ed. 2001).)On the general problem in standinglawof proba-
bilistic future injuries, see Fallon, Fragmentation, supra note 12, text at notes 14863. From
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chokeholds himself was uncertain as it plainly was the idea that his fear of such
treatment, and the continuingpall that would cast over his life as a supposedly free
citizen of California livingin LA, was not relevant to standing, was incorrect, and
would in other contexts have been recognized as more than sufficient for standing.
Recall, in Laidlaw, the Courts insistence that what standing focuses on is injury to
the plaintiff, not to the environment, and its conclusion that the plaintiffs fears of
contamination (and their actingon such fears by refrainingfrom activity in certain
areas)were reasonable even though no contamination was shown to have existed.
Notwithstanding Lyonss pleading in his complaint that he now justifiably fears that
any contact he has with Los Angeles police officers may result in his beingchoked
and strangled to death without provocation, justification or other legal excuse, his
fears were deemed merely subjective apprehensions.163In its treatment of these fears
as unworthy of recognition as an injury by the one who has already suffered such a
chokehold, Lyons may bringto mind the Plessy majoritys view that enforced sepa-
ration of the races on public transport could not be regarded as a publicly enacted
badge of inferiority, but would be so solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it.164
The failure to allow federal actions for injunctive relief by contractingstanding
was a missed opportunity for the Court to intervene to protect politically powerless
members of a racial minority group from police abuse. At the time Lyons first filed his
action in early1977, at least two motorists had died at the hands of the LAPD usingthis
technique;by the time the case was decided that number had grown to sixteen.165(The
an internal perspective of reasonableness, Lyonss fear of future assault by the police might
be considered an objectively reasonable one, whereas a white person livingin Beverly Hills
(or for that matter in New York) who had never been chokeholded but had a subjective
apprehension of this occurring would have a fear that could be considered unreasonable
and not sufficient for either compensation or proof of an Article III injury the law would
recognize. Bystander fears of future injuries might thus be distinguished from those of
actual victims of the feared behavior.
163 See Lyons, 461U.S. at 98;id. at 107 n.8 (The reasonableness of Lyons fear is depen-
dent upon the likelihood of a recurrence of the allegedly unlawful conduct. It is the reality of
the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiffs subjective
apprehensions. The emotional consequences of a prior act simply are not a sufficient basis for
an injunction absent a real and immediate threat of future injury by the defendant.). But see
supra note 162. For additional critique of Lyons for not treating the plaintiffs present injury
from continuation of the police practice as sufficient for Article III standingpurposes, see,
e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 17172
(1987);Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72CALIF. L. REV. 68, 10001 (1984).
164 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) ([T]he underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs
argument [consists]in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anythingfound in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.).
165 MyriamE. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation:Deputizing Private Citizens
in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1385(2000)(notingthese
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LAPD may have been willingto pay damages to settle claims for excessive use of
force, but such awards for reasons chronicled by scholars, and especially if they were
made pursuant to confidentiality agreements may have had little effect on police train-
ing, discipline or practices.)166U.S. legal culture enables courts and judges to protect
unpopular rights in ways that political representatives maypayso high a price for doing
as to render their efforts self-defeating. And contemporary observers of the Lyons
decision correctly intuited its disturbing and potentially dangerous implications.167
In March 1991, eight years after the Supreme Court cut off the possibility for
relief on Lyonss injunctive claim, Rodney King another African American motor-
ist in Los Angeles stopped, not for a broken taillight, but for excessive speed was
viciously beaten by members of the LAPD while a larger group of police officers
watched. Followingthe acquittal in state court of the officers involved in April 1992,
riots broke out which claimed 54lives, with over 2,000others injured;a federal trial
resulted in two of the officers beingconvicted in April 1993.168Could earlier interven-
tion by the federal courts have prevented the accumulation of poor management and
supervision of excessive force and racism in the LAPD that led to the King episode
and that may have been behind the Lyons episode?
In the summer of 1991 three months after the video of the Rodney King beating
stirred the public an independent Commission headed by Warren Christopher re-
ported on its findings: there were a significant number of officers in the LAPD who
repetitively use excessive force . . . and persistently ignore the written guidelines of the
Department; the Department itself exercised inadequate supervisory and management
numbers and stating that [t]he seventeen years since Lyons have seen a proliferation of brutal
instances of police abuse.).
166 See Armacost, supra note 154, at 472(notingthat Los Angeles paid almost $80million
in civil settlements and judgments between 1991and 1995for police misconduct);Marc. L.
Miller & Ronald Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort Claims,
52BUFF. L. REV. 757, 775(2004) ([M]any civil claims against police are resolved either
before a case is filed, or through secret settlements and judgments sealed by courts. Police
departments, cities and counties are settlingstrongcases, and perhaps even less strongcases,
but they are requiring (and probably paying for) sealed agreements.); accord Mark Iris, Your
Tax Dollars at Work! Chicago Police Lawsuit Payments: How Much, and for What?, 2VA.
J. CRIM. L. 25, 2829 (2014) (and noting that problem may be becoming worse);cf. Owen
M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93YALE L.J. 1073(1984)(notingpublic values at stake in some
cases, including cases of police brutality, and expressingconcerns generally about rising
interest in mediation and settlement over adjudicated dispositions in civil litigation). (Lyons
was not brought as a class action, but the availability of class relief has been considerably
restricted. See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 593, 60811, 61417, 61923 (2012).) The effects of Lyons (and Rizzo and OShea,
discussed supra note 150), make it quite difficult to use injunctive relief to prevent police
misconduct, in individual or class actions.
167 Standing to Seek Equitable Relief, supra note 151, at 224.
168 ALLYSON COLLINS, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE:POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IN THE UNITED STATES 199201 (1998).
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attention, promoting officers who had repeatedly been accused of using excessive
force.169The Christopher Commission also found that bias and racism were rampant
and not discouraged by management; officers typing [overtly racist messages] appar-
ently had little concern that they would be disciplined for making such remarks.170
The report also found that there was completely inadequate intake for and investigation
of complaints against officers, and that severely biased criteria were used in deciding
whether to investigate and who to believe.171This was the state of affairs eight years
after Lyons, in what another source, writingin 1998, described as [d]ecades of brutal
behavior by officers, poor management by the chief and his deputies, and racist atti-
tudes expressed at all levels of the department in word and deed.172
When political branches default in their obligation to secure constitutional rights
at risk from actions of government actors, the justifications for courts doingso are
heightened.173The problem of violent and abusive behavior by members of the LAPD
was of longstandingat the time Lyons was decided in 1983. Once a culture of lawless-
ness and violence becomes instantiated in a police department, it may be necessary
for an independent outside institution to intervene. By denyingstanding, the Court
allowed police departments to continue abusive practices (provided they resolved
damage claims when necessary), creatingwhat many regard as too little incentive for
meaningful change in practice.174
169 WARREN CHRISTOPHER ET AL.,REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT iii, ix, 141(1991)[hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION
REPORT].
170 Id. at xii.
171 See id. at xixxx, 153, 15864 (finding that the complaint system is skewed against
the complainant[] in the initiation, investigation, and classification of complaints; also finding
that the Department treated excessive force complaints more leniently than . . . other types of
officer misconduct).
172 COLLINS, supra note 168, at 199. A full generation had come to pass between the assault
on Adolph Lyons in early 1976, and this 1998report. Collins also concludes that after the 1991
Christopher Commission Report the LA Police Department did begin to make some reforms
and was slowly, on the mend. Id.;see id. at 20406.
173 Seegenerally WilliamA.Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: InstitutionalRemedies
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91YALE L.J. 635, 637(1982)(arguingthat ordinarily it is presump-
tively illegitimate for trial courts to exercise remedial discretion in institutional reform cases,
because such discretion is inevitably political in nature but that the presumption of illegiti-
macy may be overcome when the political bodies that should ordinarilyexercise such discretion
are seriously and chronically in default . . . [in which]event, and for so longas those political
bodies remain in default, judicial discretion may be a necessary and therefore legitimate
substitute for political discretion). Cf., e.g., David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial
Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 51HARV. INTL L.J. 319(2010)(defendingthe
activism of some South American constitutional courts because of the endemic weaknesses
of the political branches to govern).
174 See Gilles, supra note 165, at 1399;Armacost, supra note 154, at 45455, 46482;
sources cited supra note 166. Armacost specifically notes the viewof some police departments,
including of the LAPD, that damages and settlements are simply a cost of doing business.
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In so doing, the Court defaulted on its proper role in a constitutional democracy,
a role of special importance for those who are relatively powerless in majoritarian po-
litical settings, when they are injured by official violations of constitutional norms.175
The courts are supposed to secure to all the rule of law that is at the heart of consti-
tutionalism. In Lyons, the Court refused to allow Article III courts to do what they
might have to prevent further police violence on the citizens of Los Angeles.176Had
the lower courts been allowed to proceed, might their monitoringof reforms have
Armacost, supra note 154, at 47475 & nn. 11718 (quoting JEROME H. SKOLNICK &JAMES
J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW:POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 205(1993)). Although
the City had, in the course of the litigation, imposed a moratorium on chokeholds, it might not
have been prompted to do so without the litigation;the standingdoctrine of Lyons removed
one set of incentives for Los Angeles, and for other city police departments, proactively to seek
to prevent violations of constitutional rights.
175 The argument here is not as broad as that in Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42STAN.
L. REV. 227, 28182 (1990), which argued for viewing the case or controversy requirement in
inclusive terms in light of the primary role of the Court to enforce and interpret the Constitution
(regardless of the beneficiaries of its provisions). Indeed, Professor Bandes argued that rather
than treatingthe widespread nature of injury as a reason not to adjudicate, widespread injuries
should be treated as a signal of an issues importance and of the need for adjudication. But
because some widespread injuries are likely to be capable of beingredressed politically, the
case for judicial scrutiny may be correspondingly weaker.
176 Judicial reviewof executive action poses somewhat different challenges in a constitu-
tional democracy than does judicial review of legislative action. Enacted legislation is the
product of a democratically elected representative body;executive level action often has a more
attenuated connection to the legitimatingforce of action by an elected representative body.
A courts relative majoritarian deficit is thus, as a formal matter, usually larger in reviewing
legislation than executive action. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7793 (1969) (distinguishingbetween invalidatinga statute and
invalidatingexecutive decisions made under some general governmental authority, e.g., by
local police officers). In reviewingexecutive action, moreover, there is often the possibility
of finding the action to be ultra vires unauthorized by the proper authority, and even of ap-
plyinga clear statement canon that conduct that is constitutionally troublesome should not
be deemed authorized unless clearly so stated. Cf., e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542U.S. 507,
54245 (2004) (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurringin the judgment)(arguingthat in light of prior legislation, the Authorization for
Use of Military Force enacted after the 9-11attack should not have been deemed sufficient
authority for the detention of the petitioner). At the same time, executive action especially in
policing decisions is sometimes viewed as calling for greater judicial deference. See, e.g.,
Allen v. Wright , 468U.S. 737, 761(1984)(statingthat the idea of separation of powers under-
lying Article II requirements counsels against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to
enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructur-
ing of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties); cf. Rizzo
v. Goode, 423U.S. 362, 37880 (1976) (noting importance of giving governments wide
latitude in managing their internal affairs, including police discipline or training). But judicial
review, of both legislation and executive action, is of special importance when the challenged
government acts fall with special severity on minority groups that face unusual challenges in
protectingtheir interests through majoritarian processes. See generally ELY, supra note 20.
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helped head off the causes of the Kingincident and the mass riot that followed the
state court acquittal of the officers charged with beatinghim?
In addition to these errors in what was due to Lyons as an injured victim of ex-
cessive force and what was due the larger society of which Lyons was a part in terms
of correctingpatternsof unconstitutional conduct by its undisciplined police force the
Courts refusal of jurisdiction in Lyons implicates its own institutional self-interests,
as does the denial of standingin Clapper, as discussed in Part III below.
III. THE COURTS ROLE AND INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
Door-closingdecisions may have a third cost, beyond unfairness to individual liti-
gants and the losses to society of judicial contributions to democratic accountability
mechanisms through which constitutional values can be vindicated. That third cost
is to the legitimacy and strength of independent courts themselves. In some tension
with the idea that judicial restraint in adjudicatingsensitive issues generally supports
judicial legitimacy, I want to suggest that it may at times impair that legitimacy.
The Courts role cannot accurately be described as either countermajoritarian or
majoritarian. It is in some respects both;the vast literature on judicial reviewis divided,
both on how much of a majoritarian institution the Court is (that is, how much it de-
parts from or follows popular views),177and on what the normative aspirations for the
Courts role should be.178But to the extent that one role of the Court is to act at times
177 Compare, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 14(2009), and JEFFREY
ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH 4(2006)(both suggestingthat the Court is not very
countermajoritarian and is responsive to shifts in public opinion), with, e.g., Richard H.
Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a Majoritarian Institution?, 2010SUP. CT. REV. 103(2010)
(describing warring perspectives and disciplinary approaches of Robert Dahl, who sawthe
Court as beinglargely in tune with majorities, and Alexander Bickel, who saw the Court as
a deviant, countermajoritarian institution; criticizing the majoritarianism thesis of recent
legal scholarship;and arguingthat decisions like Citizens United suggest that the Court is
at least semi-autonomous); Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89TEXL.REV.755,
794 (2011) (criticizing what Driver calls the consensus view of the Courts interpretive
history for its anemic notion of the judiciarys capacity to protect minority rights against the
majoritys will).
178 In this Essay I will not engage at length the normative debates over the Courts role.
But there is widespread support for the idea that one of the Courts most important roles is
to secure the protection of constitutional rights, especially when those rights may be under
majoritarian pressures. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential
Element of the Separation of Powers, 17SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894(1983)(arguingthat
standingdoctrine should function to support separation of powers by limitingcourts to role
of protectingindividuals and minorities whose rights are threatened by majoritarian action
and keepingcourts out of prescribinghow the other branches should function in the interest
of majorities). Another widely accepted role is the law-articulatingand uniformity-producing
role of interpretation of norms of federal law constitutional, statutory, treaty, federal common
law. (A more controversial idea of the Supreme Courts role is to act as a superior court in cor-
recting errors of lower inferior courts errors of law, errors of fact and errors of justice.
Although modern sensibilities either outright reject the error correction role, or place it in a
176 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:127
as a countermajoritarian institution to protect the constitutional rights of relatively
powerless minorities or to put it differently, to act in ways that the political branches
cannot be expected to on such issues the Court can fulfill this role only if it has
legitimacy amongthe people, other organs of government and legal communities.
Justiciability decisions like Lyons and Clapper, alongwith a pattern of some other
door-closingdecisions since the 1970s, raise questions about its capacity to sustain
the needed degree of legitimacy over time.
The judicial legitimacy of which I speak has multiple aspects. Professor Richard
Fallon has thoughtfully described constitutional legitimacy as havingthree aspects:
legal legitimacy (which depends on legal norms), sociological legitimacy (which may
vary amongdifferent groups in a society), and moral legitimacy (which embraces con-
cerns about the moral legitimacy of both the Constitution and of actions of public
officials);he has argued that sociological legitimacy may be the foundation for much
of the Constitutions legal legitimacy.179His observations emphasize the importance
of sociological acceptance of the Courts role, by various communities of influence,
includingthe general public, elected branches of government, and legal and political
experts. In addition to legal, sociological, and moral legitimacy, there may be an in-
stitutional or role legitimacy for the Court, relating to the justifications in political
theory for the special role, and special independence, that the Court has.
Drawing on Professor Fallons insights,180and on the idea of the special institu-
tional role of the federal courts, I want to note ways in which not deciding and,
importantly, not allowing the lower federal courts to decide may impair judicial
legitimacy.
highly subordinate position, this role may well be undervalued. Beingseen as an error-
correctingcourt, at least for egregious errors of law, fact, or justice in the courts below, may
well reinforce that broader legitimacy on which its power to protect individual constitutional
rights may depend. Cf. John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87NW. U. L. REV. 1121
(1993);Vicki C. Jackson, Lee v. Kemna: Federal Habeas Corpus and State Procedure, 127
HARV. L. REV. 445, 44748 (2013) (The Supreme Court is both supreme and a court. As
a supreme court, it necessarily cannot sit as a court of errors to correct all mistakes of fed-
eral law in the lower courts, state and federal;but as a court, hearing claims of serious in-
justice, even in an otherwise small case, it can appropriately affirm the link between justice
and judging.).)
179 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118HARV. L. REV. 1787,
180305, 1824 (2005) [hereinafter Fallon, Legitimacy].
180 In this Part III, I focus more on sociological and institutional role perspectives on legiti-
macy, informed by Fallons insights on the relationship of legal to sociological legitimacy. But
what Professor Fallon calls questions of moral legitimacy might well bear on the legitimacy
of judicial decisions, includingon justiciability. It could be argued, for example, that the moral
dimensions of DOMAs discrimination against same sex marriages justified stretching standing
rules, in ways that the uncertain morality of covert surveillance in a time of newly inventive
terrorism would not. Cf. supra note 55. As I have argued, however, upholdingstandingin
Clapper would have served important constitutional purposes. For Professor Fallons recent
suggestions that there is some consistency in the Courts imposing more rigorous requirements
for standingin cases arisingin the national security area, see supra note 75.
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First, as Gerald Gunther argued, engagingin unprincipled decisionmakingabout
when to avoid decision is arguably inconsistent with the Courts being seen as a place
of principled decisionmaking. If decisionmakingby principle is a central legal task
of courts, as both Gunther and Bickel agreed it is, Gunther suggests that encouraging
unprincipled decisionmakingpart of the time undermines at least the perception of
principle when the Court does decide;this may be especially so when the Court writes
broadly on nonjusticiability so as to cut off access to federal adjudication on important
constitutional claims. Moreover, the habits of principled decisionmakingmay be more
generally undermined by departures sanctioned under prudential doctrines, especially
if courts lose the habit of honest explanation of their decisions. If justiciability doc-
trines, including standing, are applied in an insufficiently reasoned way, both legal
and sociological legitimacy may be undermined.
Second, as Gunther also argued, decisions not to decide may be perceived as
decisions upholding the challenged action. That is, contrary to Bickels expectation,
nonjusticiability decisions may be seen as legitimizingthe challenged acts. (Political
science studies of the relative lack of effect of particular decisions on diffuse legiti-
macy may cast doubt on both of these claims, so far as public/sociological legitimacy
is concerned.)181Nonjusticiability decisions may also remove pressures on the political
branches to take hard looks at challenged practices. To the extent that a challenged
practice poses problems for democratic self-government, nonjusticiability rulings
undermine the courts ability to promote democratic self-government, by deprivingthe
polity of information about whether and why a practice is (or is not)constitutional.
Apart from the Courts role in facilitating democratic decisionmaking through
information provision, there are at least two other political theory, or role-based
reasons, why justiciability decisions may pose threats to judicial legitimacy. The first
is that courts are generally understood to be distinct from legislatures not only in their
procedures, and their obligations to give reasons, but also in their having to decide
claims brought to them within their mandatory jurisdiction.182In this sense, courts pro-
vide a site within government that invites forms of participation foreclosed to many
in legislative spheres. Second, courts are made independent in part so that they can
respond, fairly, to minoritarian claims of right, in a way that majoritarian processes
may not.
To the extent that justiciability decisions sweep broadly to close courthouse doors,
and do not rest soundly on core principles, they can undermine both of these roles,
and thus part of the political theory for their separation and independence from legis-
lative and executive branches. Notwithstanding Bickels view of most justiciability
181 See, e.g., Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites,
Not the American People, 98GEO. L.J. 1515, 155153(2010).
182 Unprincipled denials of certiorari are distinct from unprincipled decisions of nonjus-
ticiability, insofar as the latter may apply to preclude any Article III court from addressing
an issue. For competingviews on the role of discretion in the exercise of jurisdiction, compare
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 5, with Martin H. Redish, Abstention,
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94YALE L.J. 71(1984).
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doctrines as a subset of discretionary avoidance devices, there are significant differ-
ences between the Supreme Courts denying certiorari which does not bar other
courts from hearing an issue and the Supreme Courts concluding that a plaintiff
has no standingto seek prospective relief on a theory that will bar many other cases
from the lower federal courts.
Finally, when questionable nonjusticiability decisions are seen as part of a broader
landscape of door-closingdecisions, they may threaten longterm support for indepen-
dence of courts, complicating the maintenance of socio-legal legitimacy and diffuse
support for the Court amongthe public, and legitimacy in the sense of legitimately
doinglaw, amonglegally trained experts.183
A. A Pattern of Closing Courthouse Doors?
Since the 1980s, it can be asked whether the Court has displayed a more general
hostility to adjudication as a tool to redress violations of law, and especially of public
law,184apart from the justiciability decisions in cases like Lyons and Clapper. Such
decisions include a line of sovereign immunity decisions barringaccess to federal or
state courts to vindicate claims under federal law against states based on an atextual
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.185 In another important doctrinal shift
183 On the diffuse nature of sociological legitimacy in the general public, see Gregory
A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36
AM. J.POL.SCI. 635(1992). On the complexity of the relationships amongthe different types
or sources of legitimacy, see Fallon, Legitimacy, supra note 179, at 1805(arguingthat socio-
logical legitimacy is necessary and at times sufficient for legal legitimacy);Or Bassok, The
Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26J.L.&POL. 239 (2011) (describing the sociological-
legitimacy difficulty as originat[ing] from a clash between the promise of an expert legal
authority and the indeterminacy of legal materials; arguing that as the perception of indeter-
minacy rose and the perception that legality only drove Court decisionmakingcorrespondingly
fell, the Courts worries about sociological legitimacy and public confidence in it affected the
Courts decisionmaking and compounded concerns about countermajoritarianismand consent).
184 On some of these changes in federal constitutional and statutory litigation in the 1990s
and the 2000s, see, for example, Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign
Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31RUTGERS L.REV.691(2000);Judith
Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress and the Federal Power,
78IND. L.J. 223(2003);Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Courts Jurisprudence, 84TEX. L.REV.
1097 (2006). For a quantitative analysis demonstrating the Supreme Courts increased hostility
to enforcement of federal law by private litigation in a study based on the Courts decisions
on four issues standing, private rights of action, attorneys fees, and arbitration in the years
between 1970and 2013, see Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, 162U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 157080 (2014).
185 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517U.S. 44(1996)(treatingthe Eleventh
Amendment as standingfor an atextual principle barringfederal courts from hearingcases aris-
ingunder federal law brought by citizens against their state);Alden v. Maine, 527U.S. 706
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relatingto the quasi-threshold defense of qualified immunity in civil rights damages
actions, the Court, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,186 moved from a doctrine designed to
protect government officials actingin good faith to one designed to provide a wide
swathe of protection from civil claims for public officials unless plaintiffs can sur-
mount the burden of showingthat the behavior in which the official engaged had been
clearly established to violate the law. In so doingthe Court drew important force away
from a central mechanism by which common law remedies enforced the rule of law
against governments.187
In procedural rulings in private civil litigation, the Court, as Professor Resnik has
shown in her recent Harvard Comment, has made it more difficult to use aggregate
forms of litigation, such as class actions that make it easier for injured consumers or
employees to seek justice.188Not only are single one-off arbitrations more difficult
for average consumers or wage earners to undertake, but they lack as Professor
Resnik has argued the possibility for public observation that can operate as what she
calls a disciplinary mechanism for government, the publicity and openness that
Jeremy Bentham valued.189 The Courts recent decision in Genesis Healthcare Corp.
(1999) (treating the Eleventh Amendment limit on the judicial power of the United States
as a bar to Congresss creating causes of action to enforce federal statutes in the state courts).
186 457U.S. 800(1982).
187 Compare Harlowv. Fitzgerald, 457U.S. 800, with, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416U.S.
232 (1974) (recognizing a good faith immunity); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170
(1804)(rejectingany immunity from liability for ship captain following Presidents orders
under what he believed in good faith, but mistakenly, to be statutory authority).
Substantive law also has been adjusted to limit the courts role in checking abusive police
conduct, as in the Courts refusal to engage in or allow analysis of the actual motivation of
police conduct where probable cause exists, which arguably has exacerbated problems of
unchecked police discretion. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517U.S. 806, 813(1996);
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). The Courts substantive decisions have
also weakened the ability of the judiciary to consider whether widespread structural discrimi-
nation requires remediation. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481U.S. 279(1987)(refusing
judicial inquiry into systemic racism in the criminal justice system by deemingstatistical evi-
dence that race of victim mattered to whether the death penalty was sought or imposed to be
irrelevant, unless a showing could be made of a specific intent in the defendants case to rely
on race).
188 See JudithResnik,Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v.Concepcion,
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125HARV.L.REV. 78(2011)[hereinafter Resnik,
Fairness in Numbers]. Hostility to consumers as claimants for some Justices goes back to
the 1980s. See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 145557 (discussing views of then-Judge Scalia and
Judge Silberman of the D.C. Circuit on standingfor consumers to challenge government failure
to require greater fuel efficiency for trucks and cars).
189 Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 188, at 87;JudithResnik, Bring Back Bentham:
Open Courts, Terror Trials, and Public Sphere(s), 5LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 2, 3,
7(2011)[hereinafter Resnik, Bring Back Bentham](arguingthat public adjudication has
democratic benefits insofar as it may engender normative contestation predicated on popular
input, while noting that public democratic engagements do not necessarily insure progres-
sive practices).
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v. Symczyk,190seemingly approved a tactic by which class action defendants can pre-
vent adjudication of the claims against them and prevent relief to the many members
of classes who may be injured but lack means or knowledge to assert their injuries.191
The expansion of threshold defenses has been accompanied by a dramatic decline
in the numbers of cases resolved through trial and public adjudication of the facts.192
In Lyons, we know from the district courts decision after a hearing on the preliminary
injunction that the chokeholds were authorized by the department;we knowsomething
about the number of persons hurt by this. As Professor Fallon argued soon after Lyons,
one of the harms of applyingconcerns over the level of future risk through standing
rather than mootness is that mootness is applied, often, after facts have been developed
in earlier stages of litigation.193Although fact and law are not the same, understanding
what the facts are can usefully inform development of the law. There is a harm to soci-
ety from not knowing, in the eyes of an impartial adjudicator, what happened in the
past when claims of unjust action by the government is at issue. Yet increasingly since
the early 1980s, threshold barriers have been erected in the adjudication of civil claims
against government officials for violation of constitutional rights, which have the effect
of cuttingoff litigation early, before facts are fully developed.194 Professor Fallons
regret over the shift from standingto mootness, as cuttingoff opportunity for public
development of the facts in adjudication, is related to Professor Resniks concerns for
the valuable role of transparency promotion that public adjudication can perform.195
190 133S. Ct. 1523(2013)(holdingthat a Rule 68offer to the single plaintiff in a class
action could moot the entire case).
191 See id. at 153237 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
192 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Trial As Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the
Meaning of Article III, 113HARV. L. REV. 924(2000).
193 Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation, supra note 39, at 5152.
194 In addition to developments noted elsewhere in this Essay, as longago as the 1970s
the Court began to restrict the availability of habeas corpus jurisdiction to reviewthe validity
of state criminal convictions, in important respects modifyingits own doctrine in the absence
of legislative changes so as to make it much more difficult for state-court convicted prisoners
to challenge their convictions. See Stone v. Powell, 428U.S. 465(1976);see also Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Congress followed the Courts lead, further restricting federal
courts habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28
U.S.C. §2254(d);see also Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529U.S. 362(2000). The costs to finality
of allowinghabeas reviewafter the initial fact-findingof final conviction raise a different set
of issues from those arisingfrom threshold barriers to first time litigation of civil claims,
however. Moreover, the Court in this regard was movingin harmony with the Congress, in
retrenchingjurisdiction, raisingfewquestions of legitimacy from the point of viewof demo-
cratic self-governance. In these two respects they differ from the cases discussed in the text
above. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)of 1996also restricted access to federal
courts, in ways in harmony with the Courts evolving views. Judicial acquiescence in such
legislative restrictions raises different kinds of questions about federal courts roles.
195 See supra notes 189, 193. Even if there is no final adjudication, the spreadingof factual
claims on a public record, subject to scrutiny by the press and the public, may have independent
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B. Door Closing, Separation of Powers and Absence of Deference to Congress
Justiciability doctrines are often justified by virtue of the separation of powers
and in particular, the idea that processes of democratic self-governance should be
left to resolve problems. Similarly, courts now frequently decline to infer causes of
action under statutes, on the theory that legislatures should be charged with the deci-
sion whether to create a judicial remedy.196Yet deference to self-governingprocesses
seems an insufficient account of the door-closing trend, in light of the Courts per-
sistent lack of deference to congressional findings in cases like Garrett,197Kimel,198
Morrison,199and Shelby County v. Holder200 where what is being protected are the
rights of states to immunity from suit or federal regulation, rather than the rights of
injured individuals. At times the Court seems to show a particular lack of respect for
Congress as compared with state legislatures.201In cases dealingwith challenges to
value in helpingdemocracies function well. See Resnik, Bring Back Bentham, supra note
189, at 3132 (discussing, for example, Benthams suggestions for independent note takers
in judicial and legislative proceedings).
196 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532U.S. 275(2001);cf. Medellin v. Texas, 552U.S.
491 (2008) (concluding that treaties were not self-executing international obligations en-
forceable by courts where the text of the treaty instrument failed to make clear the intent of
the President and Senate for the treaty to be self-executing).
197 Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531U.S. 356(2001).
198 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528U.S. 62(2000).
199 United States v. Morrison, 529U.S. 598(2000).
200 133S. Ct. 2612(2013);see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term,
Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126HARV. L. REV. 1(2012).
201 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, where the Court wrote:
A general federal power to authorize private suits for money damages
would place unwarranted strain on the States ability to govern in ac-
cordance with the will of their citizens. Today, as at the time of the
founding, the allocation of scarce resources amongcompetingneeds and
interests lies at the heart of the political process. While the judgment
creditor of a State may have a legitimate claim for compensation, other
important needs and worthwhile ends compete for access to the public
fisc. Since all cannot be satisfied in full, it is inevitable that difficult
decisions involvingthe most sensitive and political of judgments must
be made. If the principle of representative government is to be preserved
to the States, the balance between competinginterests must be reached
after deliberation by the political process established by the citizens of
the State, not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government
and invoked by the private citizen.
527 U.S. 706, 75051 (1999). This is an astonishing passage, apparently privileging repre-
sentative decisions at the state level over those at the national level, in a decision holding
unconstitutional Congresss efforts to enforce a concededly valid liability it imposed on state
governments as employers thorough actions at lawby employees to recover past due wages.
See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 46364 (1991) (referring to Congress powers
under the Commerce Clause as against the authority of the people of the states to determine
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federal statutes, such deference has played much less of a role, as the Court has en-
gaged in appellate-like review of findings on which important federal legislation has
been based. The decision invalidatinga key provision in the VotingRights Act in
Shelby County,202is only one of the more recent of a line of cases in which the Court
has given virtually no heed to congressional fact-findingand judgment on constitu-
tional issues.203
Of course, it is possible that the Court more highly values deference to political
branches in some areas affectingconstitutional rights than others, for reasons that
could be articulated. My only point here is that the nonjusticiability determinations
in Lyons and Clapper cannot be accounted for by an overarchingcommitment to def-
erence to representative branch decisionmaking. Whether this degree of consistency
matters for the Courts sociological, or even institutional, role legitimacy is unclear.
It is possible that what matters is more the overall mix of actions door closings, door
openings, refusals to decide (e.g., denials of certiorari, findings of no appellate stand-
ing), and other determinations of nonjusticiability (that may preclude Article III courts
more broadly from deciding), merits decisions, and the Courts reasoning.
It is also possible that the Courts institutional structure and role, when viewed
comparatively, raises a particular set of opportunities and challenges in sustainingits
legitimacy. To this I now turn, far more briefly than the subject warrants.
C. Door Closing, Door Opening, and the Legitimacy of a Supreme Court in
Comparative Constitutional Perspective
The Court has not been uniformly hostile to litigation against governments;the
landscape is complex, especially if substantive law is considered as well as the law of
threshold barriers. In recent decades the Court has in its substantive decisions opened
qualifications for public officers, thereby implicitly contrastingthe democratic legitimacy of
state governments with the more remote actions of the Congress). For an argument that after
Baker v. Carr, the Court came to see democracy as residingmore in the state legislatures
than in Congress, see Vicki C. Jackson, The Early Hours of the PostWorld War II Model
of Constitutional Federalism: The Warren Court and the World, in EARL WARREN AND THE
WARREN COURT:THEIR LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW (Harry Scheiber ed. 2007).
202 Shelby Cnty., 133S. Ct. 2612.
203 See, e.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 133437 (2012); Citizens
United v. FEC, 558U.S. 310(2010);Morrison, 529U.S. at 614;Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 37072 (2001); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 9091; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527U.S. 627, 654(1999)(Stevens, J., dissenting). On occa-
sion, however, the Court has apparently deferred to Congresss fact-finding where it seems es-
pecially unwarranted. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 141, 16667 (2007) (noting that
Congress made a now erroneous statutory finding that no medical schools taught the partial
birth abortion procedure, but nonetheless upholdingchallenged statute in part because of
Congresss findings that procedure was never medically necessary and the ensuing uncertainty
over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a womans health).
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the courthouse doors to claims by women,204and sexual minorities,205and the Court
has resisted congressional efforts to foreclose judicial review in habeas corpus for
executive detainees at Guantanamo and elsewhere.206 Duringthis same period, the
substantive and procedural constitutional law of property rights and analogous claims
has expanded in welcomingchallenges relatingto punitive damages,207commercial
speech,208regulatory takings,209and regulation of money in politics.210Likewise, the
courts have been quite open to claims against affirmative action for minorities brought
by members of majority groups.211
Recent Harvard Law Review Forewords portray a Court that is mistrustful of
politics, of representative government, and perhaps also of legislation that disrupts
prior distributions of wealth and power, and that shows more empathy for members
of the white majority than for racial minorities.212If these portrayals were to come to
be seen as true, over a longperiod and wide range of cases, it is hard to imagine it
would not undermine the Courts legitimacy with significant parts of the public a
public that, as a demographic matter, grows increasingly diverse. It is hard to predict
howsuch a development would affect support for the continued independence of the
courts. One mechanism by which courts decidingconstitutional challenges may gain
the support and legitimacy needed to have their judgments be respected is by being
seen as open to a wide range of claims, includingthose of powerful stakeholders (such
as different branches or levels of government), and those of ordinary citizens.213 If
204 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518U.S. 515(1996);Nevada Dept. of Human Res.
v. Hibbs, 538U.S. 721(2003). But see Nguyen v. INS, 533U.S. 53(2001);Coleman, 132
S. Ct. 1327.
205 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517U.S. 620(1996);Lawrence v. Texas, 539U.S. 558
(2003);United States v. Windsor, 133S. Ct. 2675(2013).
206 Boumediene v. Bush, 553U.S. 723(2008);INS v. St. Cyr, 533U.S. 289(2001).
207 See, e.g., Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549U.S. 346(2007).
208 See, e.g., Brown v. Entmt Merchants Assn, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (upholding First
Amendment challenge against California statute regulatingjuveniles access to violent videos).
209 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Commn, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512U.S. 374(1994).
210 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558U.S. 310(2010).
211 See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 TermForeword: Equality Divided,
127HARV. L. REV. 1(2013);see also supra notes 9297 and accompanying text (discussing
the Courts relaxed standing decisions in affirmative action cases like Gratz). As is familiar
from representation reinforcement theory, if an affirmative action program disadvantages the
majority significantly, the ballot boxcan be expected to provide a real remedy as arguably
occurred in California and Michigan, when public referenda precluded consideration of race
in admissions to higher education.
212 See Karlan, supra note 200, at 29 (referring to the Court as Protecting Spenders and
Suspecting Voters in campaign finance regulation context); Siegel, supra note 211, at 34
(describing differences in the Courts empathy for minorities and majorities bringing equal
protection claims).
213 For emphasis on the benefits to judicial legitimacy of decisionmakingabout disputes
involving major stakeholders, see Martin Shapiro, The Success of Judicial Review, in
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courts cease to be seen as places of even-handed justice, then public trust in the le-
gitimacy of the institution or public support for protecting the courts independence
may decline.
The balance of sources of legitimacy of high courts that are generalist courts,
like the U.S. Supreme Court (and the high courts of Australia and Canada, as well)
may differ from those of high courts that are established as specialized constitutional
courts, as in Germany, Austria, or France. The U.S. Supreme Court is not constituted
as a constitutional court: such courts, understood to sit between politics and law,
and charged with handlingprimarily constitutional questions, typically are staffed with
term-limited appointees.214Perhaps the most prominent constitutional court in Europe
is the German Constitutional Court, whose members serve twelve-year nonrenewable
terms. They are appointed, often in what amount to staggered groups, by the two
houses of the German parliament. The more generalist supreme courts, like those
in Canada, Australia, and the United States, typically provide longer tenure for judges
and view the constitutional authority of those courts as part and parcel of a more
general judicial task.
Without the political accountability of regular replacement of their members, it
may be more important for supreme courts (than for constitutional courts appointed
as such)to be seen as doinglaw across the range of their work and to develop doc-
trines that allowdeferral of some issues, allowingpassage of time between government
action and the sober second look of judicial review.215Adherence to the norms of
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 193(Sally J. Kenny et al. eds.
1999). For emphasis on the possible benefits to judicial legitimacy of decidingcomplaints by
individual citizens relatingto constitutional rights, as opposed to disputes involvingstruggles
between branches of government, see JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 16, at 762. See also
Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance
of Democratic Systems of Government, 35L. & SOCY REV. 117(2001)(suggesting, within
a model of courts operatingthrough strategic interactions with other government institutions
designed to assure compliance with judicial decisions, that structural issues offer less in the
way of overlapping tolerances than do individual rights decisions).
214 See generally JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 16, at 46585; Wojciech Sadurski,
Constitutional Review in Europe and in the United States: Influences, Paradoxes, and
Convergence (February 2011), Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 11/15, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1754209.
215 Professor Greenes creative and well-argued suggestion that the Article III courtsentertain
legislative standingto resolve certain disputes between the President and the Congress over
separation of powers issues, rather than waitingfor the issue to arise in a context that causes
injury to ordinary plaintiffs, see Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court 2013 TermComment:
The Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court, 128HARV. L. REV. ___(forthcoming2014),
might be thought to raise concerns, especially insofar as it would increase and accelerate the
Courts confrontation with interbranch disputes (subject to prudential decisions of the courts
whether to exercise jurisdiction), without any change in the nature of the appointment pro-
cess or in the term served by members of the Court. See also supra note 213(describingLee
Epsteins work comparing the maneuvering room of courts dealing with separation of powers
issues as compared with individual rights issues).
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legal reasoning including candid account of past decisions and some degree of
consistency in the application of justiciability standards, especially when they cut off
all recourse to Article III courts may be all the more important. Generalist high
courts may also benefit from decidingsignificant numbers of cases not involving
highly divisive constitutional issues, but which allow the court to play a valuable dis-
pute settlement function, particularly in cases where from a societal point of view
it is more important that matters be settled than which way they are settled. But this
makes it important to see how open a court is, and what else it decides.216
Yet whether the Courts particular decisions, or numbers of decisions, or reason-
ingin particular cases, affect general public regard for the Court is unclear at best.
Many political scientists conclude that disagreement with specific decisions does not
affect the Courts high diffuse public legitimacy, while noting that other factors may
affect the Courts legitimacy.217 Recent public opinion polls show public trust and
confidence in the Supreme Court declining, as it has around most (though not all)
institutions of government.218 A Gallup poll in early June 2013found more public
216 The U.S. Supreme Court has in recent years substantially cut down its docket of cases
decided. In the 1970s the Court was decidingroughly around 150cases a Term with full
opinions, and receivingunder or around 4000petitions yearly. Since 2006, the Court typi-
cally decides somewhere between 70and 85cases with full opinions most years, and receives
roughly around 8,000petitions most years. (Data is based on Harvard Law Reviews annual
compilation of Supreme Court statistics.)This reduction by roughly one half in the number
of cases decided with full opinions heightens the importance attached to what it does issue full
decisions on. (The reduction may also diminish the breadth and depth of the Courts knowl-
edge of and thinking about other cases in the legal landscape.) The Courts selection of cases
may be sagacious enough to offer adjudicatory benefits to enough significant groups, that,
to the extent its legitimacy depends on havingsupportive constituencies or stakeholders who
value the Court as a forum for decision, it is protected. But 7085 cases a year may allow less
room for error in case selection and decision than did prior practice.
217 See, e.g., Baum & Devins, supra note 181, at 155053 (summarizing data). For other
concerns about possible threats to public trust in courts in general, see Kathleen Hall Jamieson
& Bruce W. Hardy, Will Ignorance & Partisan Election of Judges Undermine Public Trust
in the Judiciary, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 11(raisingconcerns about public ignorance and
the effects of livingin states that elect judges in partisan elections, while notinghigh levels
of existingconfidence especially in Supreme Court). For an interestingargument that the
public at once has high regard for the courts and suspicion of them and that these opposing
accounts are a source of institutional durability and power, see Susan S. Silbey, The Courts
in American Public Culture, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 140.
218 The New York Times reported that in a Gallup poll in September, 2011, the Courts
approval ratingwas down to 46% from 61% in 2009. Editorial, Trust and the Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/opinion/trust
-and-the-supreme-court.html. ACBS/NY Times poll in earlyJune, 2012, found a 44% approval
ratingfor the Court. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just
44% in New Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012
/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-of-americans-approve-of-supreme-court-in-new-poll.html
?pagewanted=all.
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confidence in the military, small businesses, the police, religious or church bodies,
the presidency, and the medical system than in the Supreme Court (which was, how-
ever, rated well ahead of the Congress).219It is possible that these are just insignificant
variations in which part of the government scores best in a particular moment.220It is
also possible, as noted, that declininglevels of confidence in the Court are simply an
aspect of a general decline of confidence in government institutions.221But it would
appear that the Court an institution that, unlike Congress or the Presidency, cannot
use elections and new members to develop public support may not have quite as large
a reservoir of public confidence as it has had in the past.222
Exercisingits own jurisdiction so as to allowthe lower federal courts to adjudicate
important claims of constitutional violations of individual rights may, under some
circumstances, better promote confidence in the courts and in the Supreme Court as
accessible forums of constitutional principle than doubtful denials of justiciability.
The denials of standingin City of Los Angeles v. Lyons and Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA were based on assumptions that available information and later
events suggested were incorrect about the situation of minority group motorists
stopped by the LAPD in the later decades of the twentieth century, and about the
219 Gallup Poll June 14, 2013: Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, http://www.gallup
.com/poll/163055/confidence-institutions-2013-pdf.aspx (showing looking at top two of
five categories of confidence that public confidence rankings were highest in the military
(43% (great deal);33% (quite a lot)), then Small Business;Police;Religion or Church;then,
the Presidency (19%/17%);then the Medical System;then the Supreme Court (13%/21%);
then Public schools;the Criminal justice system;Banks;TV news;Newspapers;Bigbusiness;
Organized labor;HMOs;and then Congress (5%/5%)). Quick analysis of the results of the
same poll in 2014shows that the top four institutions remain ranked in the same order;con-
fidence in both the Supreme Court (12%/18%)and the Presidency (14%/15%)has dropped,
while these institutions have switched places in the poll. See Rebecca Riffkin, Gallup: Public
Faith in Congress Falls Again, Hits Historic Low, GALLUP (June 19, 2014), http://www
.gallup.com/poll/171710/public-faith-congress-falls-again-hits-historic-low.aspx(data available
for download at bottom of page).
220 In Gallups Confidence in Institutions Polls over time, since 2002, in six years more
confidence (based on the top two levels of confidence in the instrument)in the Presidency
than the Supreme Court was expressed;in two years about the same amount was expressed;
and in five years more confidence in the Court than the President was expressed. Gallup
Confidence In Institutions, Gallup Historical Trends, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll
/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx#1(last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
221 When Gallup began measuringconfidence in institutions, in 1973, the percentage having
a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the Court was at 45%, in the Presidency at 52%
and in Congress at 42%. In 2013, in these categories, the Court was at 34%, the Presidency
at 36%, and the Congress at 10%. See id.; Gallup poll, June 14, 2013, supra note 219.
222 In the first 18 years of Gallups polls, from 1973 to February 1991, the Court had con-
fidence ratings (in the highest two categories, see supra note 219)in the 40s and 50s%. In
October 1991it dipped briefly below 40 (39%) and was then in the 4050s% again until 2007.
Since 2007, its confidence ratings usingthese two categories have been:34, 32, 39, 36, 37,
37, 34, and 30% respectively. See sources cited supra notes 219, 221.
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scope of covert surveillance beingconducted by the NSA. Such decisions have at
least the potential to detract from respect for the Court itself.
CONCLUSION
Closingthe door to the adjudication of non-frivolous claims involvingplausible
allegations of serious government misconduct harmingdiscrete persons who seek
judicial relief has real costs:to the alleged victims;to the society in which they live;
and, potentially, to the Court itself as an institution. Justiciability doctrines must be
used and deployed in ways that plausibly enhance rather than detract from the Courts
legitimacy both with the public and with the legal community. The written decisions
must be sufficiently plausibly principled to appear as acts of a court. And they must
allow the Court to fulfill those basic functions on which its place in the constitutional
system, and through which its own institutional legitimacy, is secured. Both Lyons
and Clapper were triple error cases, in which, I suggest, the Court fell down in
performingaspects of its essential roles.
